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ABSTRACT
Humans are social animals who evolved to live in societies. They are "encultured"actors as their preferences, perceptions and values are shaped by the socialcontext to which they are exposed. Part of economic failures is due to suboptimal
social contexts which determine individuals’ decisions. These social contexts can be better
designed by organizations and governments.
The ultimate goal of this research is to emphasize that social context can be detri-
mental for individual decisions, providing empirically-based behavioral insights for
policy makers who wish to implement regulatory policies on corruption, gender gap and
injustice.
Behavioral and Experimental Economics provides a clean tool to keep the internal
validity necessary to disentangle complex behavioral aspects that cannot be easily
observed in the field, such as those related to the influence of social environment.
This Doctoral Thesis is a collection of three laboratory experimental essays about
the interplay between suboptimal social contexts and decisions. The first Chapter in-
vestigates the role of group identity in unethical decisions motivated by unfairness.
The second Chapter provides evidence of gender stereotype in perceptions of others’
risk attitudes. The third Chapter shows that small contextual changes can promote the
diffusion of corruption while others inhibit it.
Keywords: Laboratory Experiment; Behavioral Economics; Experimental Economics;
Group Identity; Fairness; Dishonesty; Risk Preferences; Gender Stereotype; Group Dis-
honesty; Punishment; Conflict of Interest; Loss Aversion
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INTRODUCTION
"[it] is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the
contrary it is their social being that determines their consciousness" (Marx,
1904)
"I did not know myself at all, I did not have any reality as my own, I was in a
state like continuous illusion, almost fluid and malleable; the others knew
me, each according to which reality they gave me" (Pirandello, 1926)
Humans are social animals who live in communities of individuals. Every individ-ual’s starting point in society is the outcome of a lottery, which is a matter ofgood or bad "fortune" (Rawls, 1971). In particular, every individual is exposed to
a random social environment, such as the family into which she is born and the city in
which she spent most of her life. Part of individuals’ goals and values are not innate, but
evolved in the social context to which they are exposed.
A well-educated family might raise the offsprings to pursue long-term goals more
than a poor family. The latter might, instead, be forced to promote an education that
centralizes short-term benefits: entering the workforce soon might allow the whole family
to earn the money necessary to satisfy basic needs, while going to school might lead
the whole family to losses. Being exposed to an environment in which resources are
scarce shifts preferences toward immediate rewards (Sturge-Apple et al., 2016). Living
in a neighbourhood characterized by a culture of organized crime affects individuals’
everyday life and their interactions with others: the threat of being punished for not
conforming to the norms of the community has a detrimental effect on pro-social behavior,
like trust and cooperativeness (Meier et al., 2016; Nese et al., 2013). Being surrounded
by pervasive corruption shapes individuals’ perceptions of ethical values, as individuals
might view dishonesty as normal and justifiable (Gächter & Schulz, 2016). Being denied
the access to the workforce shapes perceptions of fairness: to avoid cognitive dissonance
from being unable to find a job, individuals change the way they acknowledge earned
entitlement (Barr et al., 2016).
These examples suggest that preferences, perceptions and values are not exogenously
given. They are, instead, endogenously shaped by the surrounding social environment.
Social patterns alter who a person is, and those who have been exposed to a specific
1
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social context may further sustain those social patterns (Bowles, 1998; Hoff & Stiglitz,
2016).
Economists have traditionally assumed that individuals have stable preferences,
associating any change in behavior to changes in predictable factors, like information
and prices. Behavioral Economics challenges this view by engaging with the application of
psychological insights to economic analysis, and unveiling a realistic picture of individual
preferences. Extensive investigation in Behavioral Economics has shown that individual
preferences are not stable, but distorted by universally shared biases, such as anchoring,
framing and endowment effects, that the context of the moment of decision makes
salient (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). Only recently Behavioral Economics has started
incorporating insights also from sociology and anthropology, wherein decision makers are
seen as "encultured actors" (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016). This strand of Behavioral Economics
acknowledges the durable influence that social context has on behavior, preferences
and perceptions. Not only social context influences behavior by making certain cultural
mental models 1 or reference points salient , but it also shapes who people are. Some
societies are trapped into social and economic failures because, on the one hand, they
make salient suboptimal mental models and, on the other hand, they are sustained by
individuals’ conformity to those suboptimal mental models.
The ultimate goal of this work is to emphasize that exposure to social contexts
that make suboptimal mental models salient directly affects individual preferences,
perceptions and values. This research aims to provide empirically-based behavioural
insights for policy makers and organizations who wish to regulate corruption, gender gap
and injustice. Experiencing episodes of unfairness, being surrounded by an environment
that does not allow to increase welfare other than through corruption, and living in a
gender-unequal society are the three examples of exposure to suboptimal social contexts
that are investigated in this Doctoral Thesis.
The first Chapter is based on the working paper "Reacting to Unfairness: Group
Identity and Dishonest Behavior" with Matteo Ploner. It investigates a social context in
which individuals experience unfairness and the role that group identity plays in medi-
ating unethical decisions. Experimental evidence suggests that experiencing unfairness
motivates individuals to engage in unethical behavior. We conduct a laboratory experi-
ment where we investigate how group identity changes perceptions of unfairness and,
thus, unethical decisions motivated by experiences of unfairness. We define unfairness
as deviation from proportionality in a real-effort dictator game. We base our hypotheses
on the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel et al., 1971) and evidence from neuroscience (Baum-
gartner et al., 2013). Group Identity induces individuals to interpret unfairness made
by an in-group differently from that made by an out-group. While individuals tolerate
ingroup-unfairness, they react to out-group unfairness more than when unfairness is
made by an individual without a salient group identity. Our findings show that sharing a
group identity makes salient a mental model that changes perceptions of unfairness and
prevents individuals to engage in unethical behavior motivated by unfairness. On the
1 "(Cultural mental models) shape the way we attend to, interpret, remember, and respond emotionally
to the information we encounter and possess" (DiMaggio (1997), p.274).
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other hand, when the context allows for conflicting group identities to exist, individuals
become more sensitive to experiences of unfairness and, in turn, more prone to engage
in fairness-restorative unethical behavior. The implications of these findings for organi-
zations and institutions are that failing to build a shared identity is likely to promote
negative externalities on society: experiencing unfairness from someone with different
values leads individuals to react by engaging in unethical behavior at cost of society.
I started working on the project for the second Chapter "Perceptions of others’ Risk
Attitude and Gender Stereotype", co-authored with Morten I. Lau and Caleb Cox, during
my stay at Durham Business School. We conducted an incentivized laboratory experiment
to investigate the role that mental models, such as gender stereotype, play on individual
risk attitudes and perceptions of others’ risk attitudes. The stereotype that women are
more risk averse than men is cued by the salience of a stereotyped information, such as
gender, and helps conceptualizing a situation, like that in which individuals have to make
decisions based on their perceptions of others’ risk attitudes. Whether women (men)
are in fact more risk averse (taking) than men (women) is still an open question in the
literature, and decisions based on this stereotype might provide the basis for inaccurate
statistical discrimination. To this aim, we investigate gender difference in risk attitudes
and gender stereotype in perceptions of others’ risk attitudes. By structurally estimating
the risk attitude coefficients underlying two alternative latent models of choice, we find
no gender difference in risk attitudes. On the other hand, we find that males use gender
salience to stereotype others’ risk attitude: females are perceived to be more risk averse
than they actually are. This finding is of practical relevance for job employers who wish
to give promotions, as they might base their choices on stereotypes that create statistical
discrimination.
During my stay at the University of Copenhagen, I started working on the project
"Honesty Under Threat", co-authored with Marco Piovesan and Francesca Gino. The
third Chapter presents experimental evidence that small changes to a suboptimal social
context can promote the diffusion of corruption while others inhibit it. The starting point
of our suboptimal social context is the group setting of Weisel & Shalvi (2015): individuals
are exposed to an environment that gives the incentive to corrupt to earn some benefits.
This setting creates a situation in which individuals are forced to dishonestly cooperate,
even though this is against ethical values. In three experiments, we investigate how
introducing a norm-enforcement mechanism -such as second party and third party
punishment- a conflict of interest, and negative frame affects perceptions of corruption.
We find that being exposed to a suboptimal social context distorts the typical efficacy
of punishment mechanisms to enforce positive norms: by increasing dark cooperation,
punishment lowers the moral cost associated to corruption and changes perceptions
of corruption. Second, we find that introducing a conflict of interest slows down the
diffusion of corruption by making salient inequality aversion concerns. Finally, we do
not find that loss aversion has an effect on the diffusion of corruption when the group
setting is suboptimally designed. These findings are of practical relevance for institutions
and organizations that narrow the access to fair opportunities to earn benefits, while
promoting incentives that equally reward individuals in the group. In these settings,
corruption can spread in the presence of punishment among peers and non-credible
3
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monitoring. On the other hand, corruption slows down if the incentive scheme that
rewards individuals in the group embeds inequality.
It is my hope that the evidence collected in these three experimental essays will
contribute to the understanding of how to design the right social contexts which can
eventually be used to inform policy makers and organizations.
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REACTING TO UNFAIRNESS:
GROUP IDENTITY AND DISHONEST BEHAVIOR
with Matteo Ploner - University of Trento
Employees’ misbehavior can be attributed to experiences of unfairness. Does thisdishonest reaction change when employees identify with the whole organizationor with a subunit only? We experimentally investigate whether individuals
are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness
perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an
endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either share the same
group identity or have distinct group identities. Then, they approach a task in which
they can opportunistically engage in dishonest behavior. Our results show that when
individuals share the same group identity, unfair distributive decisions do not trigger
a dishonest reaction. In contrast, when different group identities coexist, dishonest
behavior is observed as a reaction to unfairness.
Keywords: Group Identity, Fairness, Dishonesty
JEL classification: C91; C92; D03; D63
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CHAPTER 1. REACTING TO UNFAIRNESS:
GROUP IDENTITY AND DISHONEST BEHAVIOR
1.1 Introduction
The general press often reports episodes of dishonest behavior: overstated value of
claims to insurance companies, consumers led to fraud through misadvice, intellectual
property theft, tax evasion. These are only a few examples of dishonest actions which
cost huge losses to society (Mazar & Ariely, 2006). Given the economic relevance of
the consequences of such a behavior, scholars from psychology and economics have
extensively examined their driving factors and the potential tools for limiting them.
Individuals might decide to engage in dishonest behavior when they are given the
opportunity. They might decide to take advantage of contexts in which the probability to
be detected is low, but they might also prefer to give up the additional profit when this is
associated to a violation of moral rules. These decisions have been widely investigated
in the literature, as we review in the dedicated session. But individuals can also opt to
behave dishonestly as a reaction to decisions made by other individuals. When employees
perceive decisions to be unfair, they become more willing to engage in dishonest behavior,
viewed as a way to balance perceived unfairness (Hollinger & Clark, 1983). An employee
might be unable to sanction an unfair supervisor and attempt to restore fairness by
increasing dishonest behavior outside organizational borders.
Organizations are communities of individuals that rely on the establishment of a
culture that regulates social interactions. Managers can promote the diffusion of a corpo-
rate culture with the aim of making employees share the same goals and values. Prior
research shows that corporate culture is crucial to foster employees’ sense of identifica-
tion in the organization and to boost employees’ productivity and commitment toward
the organization (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005). But there are also potential drawbacks to
high levels of organizational identification. First, the establishment of a strong group
identity might promote tolerance towards unfair behavior to not undermine the positive
perception of the group to which belonging. Second, modularity in the organizational
structure might encourage the development of “local” identities with different values
and goals. Therefore, between-units decisions might not be equally embraced across the
organization. The establishment of diverse group identities within the same organization
might promote the diffusion of negative externalities associated to unfair decisions made
by a supervisor belonging to a different unit. It is hard to justify unpopular decisions
made by a supervisor with different values and goals; therefore, dishonest behavior is
likely to emerge to restore fairness outside organizational borders.
As these example suggest, organizational identification might promote dishonest
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behavior at cost of society when corporate culture is not equally shared within subunits
and divisions. In our study, we specifically investigate the decision to react dishonestly
after experiencing a supervisor’s unfair action, and the extent to which this decision is
mediated by her group identity. We depict the typical organizational context in which
employees cannot react against the unfair supervisor, but they can engage in dishonest
behavior against society, such as by not buying the bus ticket. We address how one’s
decision to behave dishonestly (e.g., taking advantage from misreporting) is driven by
unfair decisions made an individual who shares the same or a different group identity.
Throughout the study, we adopt the concept of fairness-restorative dishonest behavior
to identify the reaction to unfairness caused by another individual. Individuals might
engage in dishonest behavior when they are given the opportunity to increase their
material well-being. However, they might be even more willing to act dishonestly when
they experience unfair decisions they cannot tolerate.
We investigate how group identity enters the way unfairness is tolerated and, there-
fore, how it mediates fairness-restorative dishonest behavior. We mimic the scenario in
which two employees work for the organization, but only one has the power to distribute
wages. If the least powerful employee perceives the distribution as unfair, she might feel
the need to restore fairness. Since she has no power to restore fairness by directly pun-
ishing the counterpart, she might increase her dishonest behavior outside organizational
borders.
In our experiment, participants are paired in couples and receive a payoff based
on the counterpart’s decision in a real-effort dictator game, an ideal setting to impose
unfairness on recipients and to induce a shared view of fairness across participants. In
particular, prior studies show that dictators allocate unfairly even when they agree on
which is the fair allocation (Konow, 2000; Dengler-Roscher et al., 2015) and that the
act of exerting effort elicits a shared view of fairness in the proportionality principle
(Cappelen et al., 2014). Then, participants are given the opportunity to increase their
payoff by engaging in a self-report task which is costly to the experimenter but not to
the counterpart. In the baseline condition, participants in the couple are only labeled
as recipient and dictator. In the IN condition, participants in the couple know that they
share the same group identity. In the OUT condition, participants in the couple identify
with two different groups. To induce group identification, we rely on a modified version of
Tajfel et al. (1971)’s minimal group paradigm. This way, we investigate recipients’ degree
of dishonest reactions to dictators’ decisions when group identity varies.
Our results show that dishonest behavior is not affected by perceived unfairness
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when individuals share the same group identity. On the other hand, dishonest behavior
is significantly affected by unfair decisions made by individuals with a conflicting group
identity. Thus, allowing for the coexistence of diverse group identities within organiza-
tions leads individuals to be more sensitive to unfair decisions and to react by increasing
their dishonest behavior at cost of society to restore fairness.
Additionally to highlighting a novel mechanism underlying dishonest behavior, our
study is of practical relevance to organizations characterized by a decentralized structure.
For example, organizations which fail to develop a shared corporate culture across
divisions might create the basis for negative externalities on society: employees who
cannot tolerate decisions made by a supervisor from a division they find hard to identify
with, might be willing to engage in dishonest behavior outside organizational borders to
restore fairness. For these organizations, it might be preferable to promote the diffusion
of one identity by favoring the interaction between employees from different units and
subgroups.
1.2 Relevant Literature and Hypotheses
For being substantially costly to organizations and society, dishonest behavior has
received increasing attention by scholars from psychology and economics. The standard
economic approach to dishonesty has been shaped by the strict consequentialist logic
put forward by the seminal contribution of Becker (1968): people cheat only when the
expected benefits of dishonest behavior (e.g., saving money) outweigh its expected costs
(e.g., being caught). Experimental evidence shows that the decision to behave dishonestly
to maximize earnings is, in fact, influenced by contexts poor of monetary or reputation
sanctions (see, among others, Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Ploner & Regner, 2013).
However, recent research in economics has shown that dishonest behavior is not only
driven by expected consequences (Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008; Erat & Gneezy, 2012;
Abeler et al., 2014), but also by history and context (Gino & Pierce, 2010b; Houser et al.,
2012; Shalvi et al., 2015).
Employees are routinely affected by distributive decisions made by other individuals
who work for the same organization. They work with the aim of gaining a wage that best
reflects their effort. But when a supervisor’s choice is perceived as unfair, employees try
to restore fairness by indulging in dishonest behavior at cost of others. This is especially
true when the employee has no power to react by directly punishing the unfair supervisor.
For example, Greenberg (1990) shows that when employees experience unjustified wage
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cuts, they engage in inventory theft. According to Ambrose et al. (2002), when people
perceive income distributions as unfair, they engage in sabotage behavior in the attempt
to restore equity.
Contextual elements seem to play a fundamental role in shaping fairness perceptions.
In particular, they are influenced by the underlying allocation process and the idiosyn-
cratic features of those affected by that allocation (Konow, 2003). Other studies (Gino &
Pierce, 2009, 2010a,b; John et al., 2014) report that individuals perceive unfairness in
wealth disparities due to different initial endowments and different pay-schemes.
A few studies investigated dishonest behavior as a consequence of experiences of
unfairness. In the context of a bargaining game, Ellingsen et al. (2009) report that
individuals increase their dishonest behavior after experiencing negative actions from
their counterpart. In this study, dishonest behavior is costly to the counterpart. Similarly,
Alempaki et al. (2016) investigate deception as a reciprocity device when individuals
experience unkind actions from their counterparts in a dictator game. Houser et al.
(2012) investigate the decision to cheat after individuals participate in a dictator game.
In their experiment, cheating is costly to the experimenter. Our study builds on Houser
et al. (2012)’s setting. We investigate the decision to engage in dishonest behavior which
is costly to the experimenter. Differently from Houser et al. (2012), we do not endow
participants with windfall money, but we ask them to exert effort as in the case of
employees. This way, we mimic the situation in which the least powerful employees are
not able to react to unfairness by directly punishing the unfair supervisor, but their
dishonest behavior is unlikely to be detected outside the organization while being costly
to society.
We add to this stream of research by examining how a salient group identity affects
the extent of tolerance of unfair actions. Whether group identity mediates dishonest be-
havior as a reaction to unfairness has not previously investigated. A recent experimental
study suggests that, in the context of communication games, group identity mediates
deception (Rong et al., 2016). However, deception is not considered as a device to restore
fairness. Employees might be more willing to tolerate unfair decisions when they are
made by a supervisor from the same group. This intuition, motivating our research,
originates in Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1985), wherein
individuals aim to preserve a positive image of their group members because this is part
of their own identity.
Shared group identity has been widely recognized as a means for reducing agency
problems and enhancing virtuous behaviors in organizations (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000,
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2005, 2008). A bunch of experimental studies show that individuals tend to cooperate
more when interacting with others sharing the same group identity (in-group) (Eckel
& Grossman, 2005; McLeish & Oxoby, 2011; Weng & Carlsson, 2015). In contrast,
when interacting with members of other groups (out-group), individuals display less
cooperation (Charness & Jackson, 2007; McLeish & Oxoby, 2007), coordination (Chen &
Chen, 2011; Chen et al., 2014) and other-regarding preferences (Chen & Li, 2009). SIT
provides a general framework to understand the roots of such inter-group discrimination.
When group identity is made salient, the perception of our self-concept changes and also
our behavior changes accordingly: we tend to favor the members of our group, while
discriminating against those who belong to another group (Balliet et al., 2014).
Studies by Kollock (1998); Goette (2006) and Chen & Li (2009) find that individuals
tolerate ingroup unfairness more than outgroup one. In contrast, McLeish & Oxoby
(2007, 2011) and Weng & Carlsson (2015) find that ingroup unfairness breeds stronger
punishment than outgroup unfairness. Similar to these studies, ours investigates sit-
uations in which tolerance of unfair decisions might be mediated by group identity.
However, our specific focus is not on reactions against the unfair counterpart, such as
second-party punishment, but on a type of reaction that creates negative externalities
outside organizational borders: fairness-restorative dishonest behavior.
As a measure of fairness of one’s behavior, we refer to the proportionality between
the amount contributed in the real-effort DG and the amount claimed by the dictator:
the closer the amount claimed to the amount contributed, the higher the degree of
fairness. Proportionality between inputs and outputs is at the cornerstone of equity
theory (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1958; Walster et al., 1973) and of the accountability
principle (Konow, 1996). In the following, we refer to this concept of fairness as the
proportionality principle.
To outline our predictions, we exploit the similarities between the experiment by
Houser et al. (2012) and our baseline condition in which group identity is absent. In
the light of the finding by Houser et al., we predict that individuals are more likely to
indulge in dishonest behavior when one’s behavior is perceived as unfair. This prediction
represents the benchmark against which we assess behavior when group identities are
made salient. Thus, we expect one’s unfair behavior to determine an increase in another’s
dishonest behavior. Concerning the conditions in which group identity is made salient,
we expect the relationship observed in the baseline condition to be strengthened by
conflicting group identities (OUT). Violations of norms from an outgroup member are
difficult to be tolerated and justified (Chen & Li, 2009).
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Prediction 1. OUT-group
Compared to the Baseline, the stronger the violation of the proportionality principle by
an outgroup individual, the higher the likelihood to engage in fairness-restorative
dishonest behavior.
When individuals share the same group identity (IN), we expect to observe a different
pattern. In order to preserve positive beliefs about their group identity and, thus, to
avoid cognitive costs associated to self-concept updating, individuals may interpret unfair
decisions made by a group member as not unfair. Experiencing unfair decisions made
by a group member is likely to prompt self-deception about the real nature of the offer.
In particular, individuals interpret unfairness generated within the group through a
mentalizing bias (Baumgartner et al., 2013). This leads to the following prediction
Prediction 2. IN-group
Compared to the Baseline, the stronger the violation of the proportionality principle by
an ingroup individual, the lower the likelihood to engage in fairness-restorative
dishonest behavior.
In the next session, we describe the experimental design we adopted to test our
hypotheses.
1.3 Method
Our experiment is designed to investigate dishonest behavior as a device to restore
fairness when different group identities are salient. At this aim, we rely on the minimal
group paradigm (MGP) (Tajfel et al., 1971). We conduct three variants of group identity.
In particular, we vary whether no group identity is salient (BASE), whether individuals
share the same group identity (IN), and whether individuals do not share the same
group identity (OUT).
Participants were recruited to the laboratory in even groups. In all conditions, they
were presented with a real-effort task. In the IN and OUT conditions, participants
completed a task aimed to manipulate group identity. Then, participants faced a dictator
game aimed at distributing an endowment based on the earnings from the real-effort
task. Finally, participants were asked to self-report a number which allowed them to
increase their final earnings.
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The experiment was programmed and behaviored using z-Tree software (Fischbacher,
2007)1. Upon their arrival to the laboratory, participants were randomly allocated to
cubicles and asked to privately read the instructions2. A member of the staff read
aloud the instructions and answered doubts about the experimental procedure. Before
starting the experiment, participants had to answer six control questions checking their
understanding of the instructions. Participants received on average AC9.50 in addition to
a show-up fee of AC3. Each session lasted on average 1 hour and 30 minutes.
A total of 192 students took part in the experiment. 64 were assigned to the IN
condition and 68 to the OUT condition. The remaining 60 participated to the Baseline
condition. In all three conditions half participants were randomly assigned to the Dictator
role and the other half to the Recipient role.
1.3.1 Stage 1: Real-Effort Task
In the first stage, participants were presented with a task that generates a part of their
final earning. The task is a modified version of Gill & Prowse (2012)’s real effort slider
task. Participants were asked to position a set of sliders at a correct location on the
screen, within 240 seconds. Sliders were presented in blocks of 6, with correct locations
randomly defined by the computer. Before starting, all sliders were randomly aligned, to
avoid visual learning effects. Participants generated AC1 for each block correctly solved.
We adopted this procedure to ensure that participants shared the same perception
of fairness. Evidence suggests that the mere act of exerting effort leads individuals to
perceive fairness in proportional distributions (Cappelen et al., 2014). While Houser
et al. (2012) endow dictators with windfall money, we designed this task to prime shared
perceptions of fairness in proportional distributions. Throughout the study, we refer to
Konow (1996)’s definition of fairness (i.e., equity (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1958; Walster
et al., 1973)) as the proportionality principle: a fair distribution is one proportional to the
variables that affect production and that individuals can control (i.e., work effort).
1.3.2 Stage 2: Group Identity
Participants in IN and OUT conditions were presented with a task based on the MGP.
This task enables to make salient a group identity. First, participants were asked to
guess a number ∈ {1,2,...,99} randomly drawn by the computer. According to their guess,
1Screenshots from the experiment are available in Appendix A.
2A translated copy of instructions is available in Appendix A.
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they were either allocated to one color group (Red) or to another color group (Yellow).
Specifically, those whose guess was closer to the randomly drawn number were assigned
to one group and those who were farther to another group. Participants were only told
that those in their color group were matched according to the similarity criterion just
presented3. Second, to strengthen “common fate” feelings - a major constituent of group
identity - we asked participants who were assigned the same color to take part in a
collective task4. Subjects were shown a screen containing a set of unordered pieces of
words and were asked to combine them to form a proverb. Participants received an
additional AC1 if their color group was the fastest in completing the task. To determine
which of the two groups was the fastest, individual time records of those in the group
were summed up. To test the effectiveness of group identity manipulation, participants
were asked to evaluate their perception of similarity with participants affiliated to the
same and the other color groups. Answers were reported both on a Likert scale and in a
self/other task similar to that adopted by Sani et al. (2007).
In the BASE condition, participants only played the proverb task and they were told
that they had the opportunity to win an additional AC1 in the case they were among the
fastest half of session participants. All references to group colors were omitted.
1.3.3 Stage 3: Dictator game
In the third stage, each participant was randomly assigned to either the role of dictator
or that of recipient and paired with another participant in the other role. Those assigned
to the IN condition were informed that they belonged to the same group (Red/Red or
Yellow/Yellow). Participants assigned to the OUT condition were informed that they
belonged to different groups (Red/Yellow or Yellow/Red). In these conditions, both players
shared common knowledge of group membership. Participants assigned to the BASE
condition were only informed about their roles. The dictator was asked to allocate
between herself and the other the sum that they generated in the Earnings stage, which
was also of common knowledge by both players.
Our modified dictator game is the ideal setting to induce dictators to make unfair
3We did not disclose to participants whether they belonged to the closer or farther group to avoid
possible entitlement feelings among those guessing better. Furthermore, we chose a trivial task to avoid
potential biases in group composition when the discrimination criterion correlates with unobservable
features.
4 In contexts where group identity is imposed on existing one, as it happens in the laboratory, the
salience that commonly categorized individuals are homogeneously treated helps identification (Kramer &
Brewer, 1984).
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decisions against recipients. Previous studies on allocation choices document that individ-
uals claim more than what they earned when they have a personal stake in the decision
outcome (Konow, 2000; Cherry et al., 2002), although they recognize that proportional
claims are the fair ones (Dengler-Roscher et al., 2015). Therefore, by claiming non-
proportional offers of a co-produced outcome, dictators force recipients into an experience
of unfairness.
1.3.4 Stage 4: Questionnaire
The Questionnaire stage consists both of non-incentivized self-reported answers and of in-
centivized answers. For what concerns the former, we asked participants to answer a sur-
vey about subjective perceptions of fairness in the allocation task and socio-demographic
characteristics. For the latter (Social Norm Task), we asked participants to rate in terms
of social appropriateness a hypothetical scenario that recalls a dictator game exploiting a
task based on Krupka & Weber (2013) 5. This way, we obtained a measure of the shared
perceptions of fairness across participants.
Finally, we provided participants with a self-report task apt to elicit dishonest behav-
ior via untruthful reports (Dishonesty task). Previous studies elicited dishonest behavior
by looking at self-reported task score (Mazar et al., 2008; Cadsby et al., 2010) or at
outcomes of a random event (Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011; Houser et al., 2012; Fischbacher
& Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Ploner & Regner, 2013). We elicited dishonest behavior with a
novel method similar to that of Gill et al. (2013). They asked subjects to report the last
digit of their best friend’s number to obtain a more precise distribution of dishonesty
degree. We asked to self-report the last digit of the last call they made being aware that
they are going to earn AC0.50 times the number reported (i.e., maximum earnings are
obtained when the last call ends with 9)6. While participants were free to report the
value without any control from our side, we invited them to check the call list on their
mobile phone. This way, we reduced any potential contextual ambiguity that may lead
individuals not to perceive that they are lying (Shalvi et al., 2015).
5In Krupka & Weber (2013) the group of subjects answering the question was different from the group
of subjects that played the dictator game.
6The exact payoff rule was presented only in the screen of the computer in concomitance to the task
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1.4 Results
We first analyze dictators’ allocation choices and provide an assessment of shared per-
ceptions of fairness among participants. Then, we present results of the dishonesty task
and a regression analysis inquiring about determinants of dishonest behavior.
1.4.1 Fairness
Figure 1.1 provides a joint representation of claims by the dictators in the Dictator game
and outcomes in the Real-Effort task, in each of the experimental conditions separately.
As the graphs show, dictators’ claims largely violate the proportionality principle,
with most of the observations lying above the 45◦ line. This is confirmed also by the inter-
section between average claims and average contributions, well above the proportionality
line in all conditions.
As a measure of the opportunistic stance of dictators, we compute the share of
resources of the other appropriated by the dictator. This index of deviation from propor-
tionality is computed as φ= piD−eDeR , where piD is the actual payoff claimed by the dictator,
eD is the amount earned by the dictator and eR is the amount earned by the recipient 7.
Table 1.1: Violation of proportionality
Median Mean SD N
IN 0.464 0.518 0.364 32.000
OUT 0.400 0.388 0.404 33.000
BASE 0.500 0.541 0.356 28.000
The proportionality index is computed as the amount of other’s earnings appropriated relative to
other’s earnings (φ= piD−eDeR ). When φ= 0, the allocation is fully in line with the proportionality
principle. When φ> 0, an opportunistic violation of the principle is detected.
As Table 1.1 shows, the largest average (median) violation is observed in condition
BASE, followed by IN and OUT. In all conditions the deviations are significantly larger
than zero according to a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (all p-values < 0.001). A series of
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests shows that differences across experimental conditions are not
statistically significant (all p-values > 0.125).
Dictators largely violate the proportionality principle and appropriate a considerable
amount of resources generated by their counterpart. No significant differences in the
degree of violation of the proportionality principle are observed across group conditions.
7All dictators and recipients exerted a positive amount of effort, i.e. completed at least one page, in the
slider task and, therefore, earned a positive amount.
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Figure 1.1: Dictators: Contributions and Claims
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On the x-axis (Earnings), the amount earned in the slider task. On the y-axis (Claims), the
amount claimed in the DG. Points above (below) the 45◦ line identify claims larger (smaller) than
the amount contributed. Average values are reported along the axis. To improve visualization, a
small random noise is added to the graph.
This suggests that dictators were not affected by our experimental conditions, in line
with previous studies (Konow, 2000). All dictators decided to take more than what they
earned, because they were responsible for the allocation decision. By doing so, they forced
all recipients into an experience of unfairness.
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1.4.2 Perceptions of Fairness
Table 1.2 provides a representation of the shared perception of fairness in the popula-
tion, as collected in the Social Norm task. Participants are presented with a scenario
resembling a dictator game and asked to assess the degree of social acceptability of each
potential allocation.
Table 1.2: Perceptions of fairness
Freq (%)
Allocation Average −− − + ++
0|6 -0.312 41.1 25.0 23.4 10.4
1|5 0.420 10.4 18.8 18.2 52.6
2|4 0.250 3.6 17.7 66.1 12.5
3|3 0.299 4.7 22.4 46.4 26.6
4|2 -0.295 22.9 51.0 23.4 2.6
5|1 -0.671 62.0 30.2 4.2 3.6
6|0 -0.861 88.0 6.80 1.6 3.6
The column Allocation reports potential allocations to two individuals, with 1|5 being the
allocation respecting the proportionality principle (bold font). Participants face four assessments
for each allocation: “Very unacceptable” (−−), “Quite unacceptable”(−),“Quite acceptable”( +) and
“Very acceptable” (++). Frequency of choice for each of the assessment is reported in the table
(Freq %). Similarly, to Krupka & Weber (2013), the column “Average” is computed by assigning
values -1, -1/3, 1/3, and 1 to the evaluations of acceptability of the allocation in increasing order
of acceptability.
As the table illustrates, the allocation deemed as the most acceptable is the one reflect-
ing proportionality (1|5), with an average of 0.420. All other allocations are judged, on
average, unacceptable. This result allows us to rule out the possibility that participants
engage in dishonest behavior to restore a different fairness criterion from proportionality,
such as inequality.
Table 1.3 reports self-reported measures about the perceived fairness of dictator’s
choices. Larger values capture a stronger perception of fairness.
As Table 1.3 shows, dictators perceive their choices as fairer than the matched
recipient, across all conditions and questions. To test whether perceptions statistically
differ, we compute the average at the individual level of the answers to the three
questions. When comparing average perceptions of dictators and recipients, a statistically
significant difference is observed for condition BASE and IN (Wilcoxon Rank Sum test,
both p-values < 0.013), while a marginally significant difference is observed in condition
OUT (Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, p-value = 0.051). When comparing averages across
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Table 1.3: Perception of fairness
Mean(SD) Dictator Recipient
BASE
Fair 4.133 (2.145) 3.100 (2.369)
Fair|Outcome 3.600 (2.078) 2.633 (2.312)
Fair|Effort 3.800 (1.864) 2.367 (2.042)
IN
Fair 4.625 (1.963) 3.125 (2.366)
Fair|Outcome 4.500 (2.125) 2.688 (2.132)
Fair|Effort 4.875 (1.930) 2.375 (1.963)
OUT
Fair 3.971 (2.249) 3.353 (2.650)
Fair|Outcome 3.824 (2.355) 2.882 (2.459)
Fair|Effort 3.941 (2.074) 2.676 (2.371)
For dictators (recipients), the row labeled Fair refers to the statement “I feel that I treated the
other fairly” (“I feel that the other treated me fairly”). The row Fair|Outcome refers to the
statement “I feel that I treated the other fairly given the outcome in the slider task” (“I feel that
the other treated me fairly given the outcome in the slider task”). The row Fair|Effort refers to
the statement “I feel that I treated the other fairly given the effort in the slider task” (“I feel that
the other treated me fairly given the effort in the slider task”). Answers are collected on a Likert
scale 1–7, with 1 meaning “I totally disagree” and 7 meaning “I totally agree”.
conditions given the role, no statistically significant differences are observed (Wilcoxon
Rank Sum test, all p-values≥ 0.110).
To gain insights into the source of feelings of fairness, we compute correlations be-
tween average feelings of fairness in the statements of Table 1.3 and the proportionality
index of Table 1.1 (Spearman’s rank correlation). We expect to observe a negative correla-
tion between the index capturing violations of proportionality and perception of fairness.
The strongest correlation is observed for the dictators in condition OUT (ρ =-0.830),
while the lowest correlation is observed for dictators in condition IN (ρ =-0.418).
When evaluating the fairness content of their actions, dictators seem to adhere
to a mentalizing bias aimed at reducing the cognitive dissonance originating in the
discrepancy between the—generally acknowledged—fairness norm and the actual—
generally selfish—behavior. Accordingly, dictators perceive their actions as fairer than
what perceived by their counterpart. Furthermore, dictators in condition IN display a
weaker sensitivity to violations of proportionality in terms of fairness perception. Shared
group identity would call for fair behavior and when this does not happen, dictators may
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Figure 1.2: Self-reported numbers
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Self-reported last digit number of the last phone call made by dictators (leftward panel) and
recipients (rightward panel), in each of the three experimental conditions separately. The dashed
horizontal line provides a reference for the ideal uniform distribution of values. To improve
visualization, a small random noise is added to the graph.
reduce their discomfort by re-assessing the fairness of their behavior.
1.4.3 Dishonesty
Figure 1.2 shows a description of behavior in the dishonesty task embedded in the
questionnaire. Larger numbers are associated to higher gains.
As the figure shows, the distribution of reported values is negatively skewed, with
the mass of the distribution shifted towards higher values and a spike at the highest
admitted value. A series of χ˜2 tests confirms that reported values are not uniformly
distributed (all p-values< 0.038). The tendency to self-report high numbers is testified
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also by averages of the distributions, with values ranging from 6.233 (Recipients, BASE)
to 7.206 (Recipients, OUT). The central tendency of the distributions is significantly
larger than the expected average value of 4.5, in all three conditions and for both roles
(Wilcoxon Signed Test, all p-values < 0.001).
A comparison of the distributions across experimental conditions for each role shows
that there are no significant differences in the central tendencies of the distributions
(Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, all p-values > 0.253). When given the opportunity, participants
dishonestly manipulate reported numbers to increase their earnings.
1.4.4 Is dishonesty influenced by unfair decisions?
Individuals might report dishonestly not only because of low monitoring, but also because
they do not tolerate the unfairness experienced. In particular, we predict that recipients’
dishonest behavior is affected by the unfair dictator’s group identity. At this aim, we look
at the relationship between reported values and allocations across group conditions and
roles.
Figure 1.3 shows that for dictators, a positive correlation between unfairness and
reported values is registered in all conditions, though the relation is not statistically
significant (Spearman’s rank correlation, all p-values≥ 0.113). This suggests that dicta-
tors were not affected by the group identity manipulation, but they behaved as unfairly
as dishonestly throughout all conditions 8. For the recipients, a negative and slightly
positive correlation is observed in BASE and IN, respectively. However, these correlations
are not statistically significant (all p-values ≥ 0.581). In contrast, in condition OUT a
positive and marginally significant correlation is observed (p-value=0.080).
To address the causal relationship between unfairness and dishonest behavior given
different types of salient group identity we run a regression model 9. Table 1.4 reports on
the outcomes of a regression estimate about determinants of dishonest behavior of those
acting as recipients in the Dictator game. The dependent variable Reported.value is
given by the integer reported in the dishonesty task described above10. When reports are
8In Appendix A, a discussion of results of an Ordered Probit Regression model of dictators’ dishonest
behavior supports this insight.
9We relied on the randomness of unfair claims by individuals who have been randomly assigned to the
dictator role.
10 We employed an Ordered Probit model to account for the heterogeneous attitude individuals display
when they report increasingly high values. Individuals might care about maintining a positive view of
their self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008) or they might suffer from intrinsic costs when they lie (Abeler et al.,
2014). Reporting average values might allow to more easily preserve own self-concept or manage lying
costs than reporting the highest values. Therefore, the Ordered Probit model allows us to account for
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Figure 1.3: Self-reported numbers and unfairness
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On the x-axis, the proportionality index φ= piD−eDeR . On the y-axis the value reported in the Dis-
honesty task. For dictators, higher values on the horizontal axis imply more unfairness favoring
them. Conversely, for recipients higher values on the horizontal axis imply more unfairness
damaging them. In each panel, a Spearman’s rank correlation ρ is presented.
truthful, the dependent variable and explanatory variables are orthogonal. When this is
conceptual differences between reporting average values, such as 4 and 5 (i.e. mild dishonesty), and high
values, such as 8 and 9 (i.e. brazen dishonesty)
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not the case, we obtain evidence of distorted behavior.
Among explanatory variables, we have dummy variables controlling for group identity
conditions: IN is equal to one when the recipient belongs to the same group and zero
otherwise; OUT is equal to one when the recipient belongs to the other group and zero
otherwise. BASE is the baseline condition.
We enrich the model with fairness-related variables: the proportionality index φ
(prop.index, see Table 1.1) of matched dictator’s choices and the extent according to
which proportionality is perceived as appropriate in the Social Norm task (prop.norm,
see Table 1.2). The interactions between the fairness-related variables and the group
experimental conditions are also added. Finally, we consider a few control variables:
report.time (the time in seconds required to report the value); age; f emale, and
civic.score (a categorical variable of individuals’ participation to collective activities,
such as political parties and NGOs).
Table 1.4: Recipients’ self-reported values (Ordered Probit regression)
(1) (2) (3)
rep.value rep.value rep.value
prop.index 0.011(0.249) -0.57(0.543) 0.648(0.545)
prop.norm -0.187(0.244) -0.637(0.489) -0.681(0.493)
IN -0.365(0.645) -0.466(0.65)
OUT -0.781(0.671) -0.725(0.673)
prop.index× IN 0.427(0.645) 0.559(0.667)
prop.index×OUT 1.486(0.489)∗ 1.60(0.769)∗∗
prop.norm× IN 0.352(0.628) 0.374(0.639)
prop.norm×OUT 0.837(0.647) 0.689(0.659)
report.time 0.00398(0.007)
f emale -0.2689(0.249)
age -0.0144(0.045)
civic.score 0.013(0.111)
Observations 93 93 93
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
An Ordered Probit regression model is adopted to account for the different attitude individuals
display when they report increasingly high values.
As Table 1.4 shows, our explanatory variables cannot systematically explain the value
reported. The only exception is observed for the interaction term between prop.index
and OUT. Both Model (2) and (3) show that in condition OUT a stronger violation of
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proportionality by the dictator positively impacts on the reported value. This does not
happen in BASE and IN 11.
The regression analysis shows that experiencing higher unfairness induces more
dishonest behavior only in condition OUT: when dictators and recipients belong to
different groups, dishonest behavior significantly increases to restore fairness.
1.5 Conclusions
In this study, we investigated dishonest behavior as a way to restore fairness when
different types of unfair individuals’ group identity are salient. We ran a laboratory
experiment to mimic the situation in which two employees work for the same organi-
zation but only one can control the joint allocation of rewards. In this situation, the
employee facing unfairness cannot directly react against the unfair supervisor, but she
can react opportunistically outside the organization, without any credible threat of being
sanctioned. We find that unfair individuals’ group affiliation significantly affects the
likelihood of undertaking dishonest behavior to restore fairness, with conflicting group
affiliations fostering fairness-restorative dishonest behavior.
To investigate dishonest behavior as a reaction to unfairness we needed to ensure that
participants shared the same perception of fairness. Consistent with previous research
(Cappelen et al., 2014), we find that the real-effort task was effective to prime perceptions
of fairness in the proportionality principle. This was confirmed by responses to the Social
Norm task.
Crucial for addressing our hypotheses was designing a setting that allowed recipients
to experience unfair decisions. Consistent with previous findings (Konow, 2000; Dengler-
Roscher et al., 2015), we observed that dictators allocated to themselves more than what
they believe is fair. Across all group conditions the index of proportionality revealed that
allocations were self-oriented. Therefore, our modified dictator game was an effective
setting to impose experiences of unfairness on recipients and to prepare a propellant for
fairness-restorative dishonest behavior.
Consistent with previous research on dishonest behavior, we find that individuals
behave dishonestly to increase their earning when they are given the opportunity (Fis-
chbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Ploner & Regner, 2013). Although across all conditions
responses to the survey on perceptions of experienced unfairness confirmed that re-
11Results are confirmed by a Tobit model to account for potential censoring in the data from the
dependent variable - bounded between 0 and 9.
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cipients acknowledged that dictators allocated unfairly, dishonest behavior increases
only when individuals experience unfair decisions made by an out-group member. Re-
gression results suggest that group identity enters the way unfairness is tolerated and,
thus, moderates fairness-restorative dishonest behavior. Recipients were more willing
to engage in dishonest behavior to restore fairness after experiencing unfair decisions
made by an outgroup member. Contrary to our prediction, unfairness was irrelevant to
purge dishonest behavior when recipients received unfair allocations from an ingroup
member compared to when recipients received unfair allocations from a dictator without
a specified group identity.
Why should recipients react to unfairness when they are matched with an outgroup
while refraining from the attempt to restore fairness when they are matched with an
ingroup? The explanation lies at the roots of SIT. Conditional on which group identity
is salient, individuals engage in different mentalizing processes of the norm violation
(Baumgartner et al., 2013). Recipients interacting with an unfair dictator with a differ-
ent group identity have no reasons to put themselves in her shoes. They do not need
to preserve their beliefs about their group identity and, thus, mentalize toward the
unfair dictator. Instead, they perceive norm violations intolerable and attempt to restore
fairness by becoming more inclined to dishonest behavior. In contrast, when a shared
group identity is salient, recipients easily mentalize toward unfair dictators to maintain
intact their beliefs about the group. A shared group identity would call for fair allocations,
and when this is not the case, recipients may avoid potential discomfort by justifying
dictator’s behavior.
In contrast with Houser et al. (2012)’s finding, we did not observe dishonest behavior
motivated by unfairness in the Baseline. This might explain why we do not find that
ingroup recipients engage in less fairness-restorative dishonest behavior than recipients
in the Baseline. Our intuition is that the fact that both the recipient and the dictator
exerted effort, made salient the idea of asset legitimacy (Mittone & Ploner, 2012) and
mediated reactions to unfairness. Recipients in Baseline accept unfairness from a dictator
because they acknowledge the additional effort exerted by the dictator to decide how to
allocate the co-produced endowment.
Our study shows that group identity mediates fairness-restorative dishonest behavior
and provides us with some insights into the working of organizations. Organizations may
try to improve the productivity of employees by introducing competitive payment schemes
(i.e., tournament incentives). Schemes of this kind may potentially promote perceptions of
unfairness that, in turn, lead individuals to restore fairness through dishonest behavior.
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In this study, we addressed the hidden danger of allowing for the coexistence of conflicting
group identities: this latter is likely to prompt extreme sensitivity to unfair distributions
that translates in determining negative externalities outside organizational borders.
When managers fail to limit local identification in each subunit and division, they
might promote employees’ dishonest decisions that are costly to society: when employees
are imposed unfair decisions by a supervisor from a division with different values and
goals, they are likely to perceive unfairness and to correct it by substantially increasing
their dishonest behavior outside organizational borders.
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PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS’ RISK ATTITUDE AND
GENDER STEREOTYPE
with Caleb Cox - Virginia Commonwealth University
and Morten I. Lau - Durham Business School and Copenhagen Business School
Individual risk attitudes and perceptions of others’ risk attitudes might influencemany economic outcomes, such as occupational segregation and job promotions.We conduct an incentivized laboratory experiment to assess how individual risk
attitudes and perceptions of others’ risk attitude are biased by gender stereotype. We
structurally estimate coefficients of risk attitudes under the Expected Utility and Rank
Dependent models of choice and find no gender difference in the curvature of the utility
function. We find evidence of gender stereotype bias: males use gender information for
stereotyping others’ risk attitude.
Keywords: Risk Preferences; Gender Stereotype; Laboratory Experiment
JEL classification: C91; D81; Z1
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2.1 Introduction
Different individual risk attitudes and different perceptions of others’ risk attitudes
are potential sources of conflict in many social interactions. In particular, if females
(males) are wrongly perceived to be more risk averse (taking) than males (females),
females or males may be disadvantaged in situations where incorrect perceptions of
their risk attitudes have an influence on the decision making process. As an example,
employers might base corporate promotions on gender stereotypes if the candidate’s
gender is known to the decision maker (Wyer Jr & Wyer Jr, 1998). Furthermore, when
inaccurate beliefs are internalized, they might channel decisions involving risk, such
as occupational choices, and lead to selection into jobs that require less (more) risky
decisions (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000).
We conduct a laboratory experiment with students at Durham University and elicit
their individual risk attitudes and beliefs about the risk attitudes of other students who
participated in the experiment. The experiment consists of two parts. In the first part,
we use an existing experimental design and elicit individual risk attitudes over real
monetary outcomes. A set of 40 lottery pairs allows us to study several dimensions of
individual risk attitudes and compare Expected Utility Theory (EUT) to the alternative
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory (RDU). This set of decision tasks is based on the lotteries
in Harrison & Swarthout (2012, 2014) and Harrison et al. (2015).
Whether females and males differ in their risk attitude is still debated in the lit-
erature. Therefore, we disentangle gender difference in risk preferences and address
whether the shared belief that females are more risk averse than males is a stereotype.
In the second part of the experiment, we use the same set of decision tasks and elicit
subjective beliefs with respect to risk attitudes of other participants in the experiment,
where the subjects are informed about the gender of the other (target) person. This
allows us to investigate whether individuals use gender as an information device to
form beliefs about others’ risk attitude. Particularly, perceptions of others’ risk attitudes
may be biased by observable characteristics, such as gender (Ames, 2004). Therefore, by
providing information on the gender of the other person we investigate stereotype bias.
Our study adds to the literature on perceptions of others’ risk attitude and gender
difference in individual risk preferences, first, by eliciting risk behavior and beliefs in
fully incentivized tasks and, second, by estimating risk attitude coefficients underlying
non-EUT latent models of choice. While we do not find gender difference in risk prefer-
ences, we find that individuals use gender to predict others’ risk attitude. In particular,
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we find that perceptions of others’ risk attitude are biased by the inaccurate stereotype
that females are more risk averse than males.
2.2 Existing literature
Surprisingly little work has been done on the association between individual risk at-
titudes and stereotyped perceptions of others’ risk attitudes in controlled laboratory
settings. Hsee & Weber (1997, 1998, 1999) were the first to address this issue. They
present subjects with seven hypothetical decision tasks in which they are asked to select
a sure amount or a lottery with a 50-50 probability distribution over two outcomes.
Subjects are then asked to predict the choices made by others in similar decision tasks,
where the reference to others differs across the three studies, from "somebody somewhere
in the US" to "an average student on campus" to "the individual sitting next to them."
One concern in this study is that the decision tasks are not incentive compatible 1. The
subjects are not paid according to their decisions, and both observed risk attitudes and
subjective beliefs may be influenced by hypothetical bias 2.
This early work provided inspiration for later studies with incentive compatible deci-
sion tasks, and two elicitation methods in particular have been used to elicit individual
risk aversion and stereotyped beliefs: in the Multiple Price List (MPL) design the subject
is presented with an ordered array of binary lottery choices, whereas in the Ordered
Lottery Selection (OLS) design the subject chooses one lottery from an ordered set of
several lotteries.
In the MPL, popularized by Holt & Laury (2002), subjects are presented with an
array of binary choice tasks between two lotteries, where each lottery typically has two
outcomes. The subjects are asked to select one of the two lotteries in each decision task
and one decision task is randomly selected for payment. This method has been widely
1 Subjects are paid $50 in the third experiment by Hsee & Weber (1997) if all predictions are accurate.
2Other studies have used hypothetical decisions tasks to elicit individual risk attitudes and stereotyped
beliefs with respect to the risk attitudes of others.
Siegrist et al. (2002) use the same design as the first and second experiment in Hsee & Weber (1997),
but instead of referring to "most other students in the US" they also look at gender differences and refer to
"most other female students in the US" and "most other male students in the US".
Daruvala (2007) employs a modification of the Becker et al. (1964) procedure (BDM). Although the
elicitation method in theory is an incentive compatible measure, there is some concern about the cognitive
efforts that are required to understand the decision tasks, even if they are hypothetical (Holt & Laury,
2002; Plott & Zeiler, 2005). Daruvala (2007) conducts a laboratory experiment in which the participants
are asked to state the certainty equivalent of a lottery with two outcomes, and then asked to predict the
certainty equivalent of the same lottery for each participant in the room. While no gender difference is
found in this study, there is some evidence of gender stereotype bias in predictions of others’ risk attitude.
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used to elicit individual risk attitudes since the reward structure is transparent and
simple, and one can easily derive measures of absolute and relative risk aversion from
observed choices. Despite the simplicity of the elicitation method there is some concern
about possible framing effects in this design, although it is possible to identify and correct
for possible framing effects (Andersen et al., 2006).
The MPL was adopted by Roth & Voskort (2014) who conducted an artefactual field
experiment with senior and junior financial advisors and students. First, they present
subjects with the MPL task. Then, they ask subjects to predict the choices made in
the same MPL task by some profiles of respondents to a web-based survey 3. They
can base their predictions on information about the profile which varied according to
two conditions. Subjects assigned to the "Rank" condition are, first, asked to assign
a preference ranking to each of the profile’s attributes and, then, to predict the risky
choices of four profiles. Subjects assigned to the "Pay" condition are, first, asked to pay for
disclosing each profile’s attributes and, then, to predict the risky choices of four profiles.
The prediction task in both conditions is incentivized 4. The authors find that on average
professionals are more risk seeking in their decisions than when making predictions
on the profile. The authors report evidence of stereotype bias. Subjects use available
information about the profile to form their beliefs. Particularly, they find that predicted
number of safe choices increases when the profile is female 5.
3Web-survey respondents are recruited via E-mail and are asked to circulate the survey. They are
presented the same MPL task used in the experiment. However, they are not paid according to their choices.
The authors mention that participants who complete the web-based survey are given the opportunity
to win AC50. From the web-survey the authors create eight profiles, each characterized by a different
combination of seven attributes, such as sex, age, marital status, level of education, number of children
and income.
4In the "Rank" condition, for each profile the computer assigns a random number to the preference
ranking and determines the number of attributes to disclose to subjects. In the "Pay" condition, for each
attribute and for each profile, subjects choose which characteristics are uncovered by paying according to a
scoring rule (e.g., the first attribute costs AC0.01 and all attributes cost AC0.99). In both conditions, if the
prediction for a profile is correct the subject receives AC0.50.
5In addition to the MPL, Roth & Voskort (2014) adopt another incentivized mechanism to elicit risk
preferences and beliefs about risk attitude of others. They ask subjects to hypothetically invest up to
AC100.000 into a lottery that doubles or halves the amount invested with 50/50 probability. To provide
incentives, the high stake amounts are divided by 4 for the actual payment. Then, they ask subjects to
predict the amount invested by each profile. As for the MPL, web-survey respondents are presented with
the same investment question. However, they are not paid according to their choices. According to the
"Rank" and "Pay" conditions, subjects can base their predictions on available attributes of each target
profile. If the prediction for a profile is correct, subjects received AC0.50.
To define prediction errors, they use responses to the investment question by respondents to another
survey (the German Socioeconomic Panel) which contains 20,750 subjects. However, the authors do not
mention whether in the Panel the investment question is incentivized. First, they compute representative
counterparties for the combination of the seven attributes of each profile. Then, they define prediction
errors as the squared difference between predicted amount not invested and the mean amount not invested
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The second method adopted to derive stereotyped beliefs over others’ risk attitudes is
the OLS developed by Binswanger (1980, 1981). In particular, Eckel & Grossman (2002,
2008) use an OLS-based design in which subjects are presented with a choice of five
lotteries and asked to pick one. Each lottery has two possible outcomes, each with a 50-50
chance. While the instrument is easy to understand, it restricts the probabilities to 12 .
This way, it does not allow to make inferences about non-EUT models of choice behavior,
such as probability weighting. To investigate predictions of risk attitude of others, they
conduct an experiment in which they ask 261 students to predict each other’s choices.
Subjects are distributed across loss and gain treatments and are seated at tables with
unobstructed views of all session participants. Subjects are asked to select one lottery
from a set of five gambles. Then, they are asked to predict how each participant in the
session would choose in the same task. First, they report gender difference in risky
choices: on average males choose riskier alternatives than females in all treatments.
Then, they report gender difference in predicting risk attitudes of others: males are
predicted by both males and females to be less risk averse than females. Finally, they do
not find gender difference in the accuracy of predictions made by females and males.
Other studies took inspiration from Eckel & Grossman (2002, 2008)’s design to
investigate stereotyped predictions of others’ risk attitude. Ball et al. (2010) recruit 182
students to investigate how predictions of risk attitudes of others are influenced by
targets’ physical appearance. Subjects are first asked to select a gamble from a set of six
alternative gambles and, then, to predict the gamble chosen by each session participant.
Each subject is also asked to use a dynamometer to collect a measure of individual
physical prowess. They find that predictions reflect gender stereotype. Particularly,
they find that observable characteristics associated to gender stereotyping, such as
attractiveness for females and strength for males, affect predictions of females’ and
males’ risky choices.
The study by Grossman (2013) is also an adaptation of Eckel & Grossman (2002,
2008)’ s design. They recruit 90 students to predict each session participant’s risky
choice. First, they ask to select a gamble from a set of six alternative gambles. Then
they ask to predict the risky choice of each subject in the session twice. Subjects are
randomly assigned to two conditions. Those assigned to the "Visual/Info" condition
by the representative profile. By running a regression model with the prediction error as dependent
variable and available attributes as independent variables, the authors claim that prediction accuracy
increases when more information is available. A major concern associated to this conclusion is the bias
derived from the Panel responses, since these have not been incentivized. Experimental subjects’ prediction
error is computed with Panel responses as representative counterpart for each target profile, therefore
prediction accuracy is likely to embed the bias from the non-incentivized Panel responses.
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are asked to predict the gamble chosen by each session participant the first time by
having unobstructed view of each participant; next, they are told they can revise the
first predictions after being provided each target’s responses to a question about social
risk and financial statement. Those assigned to the "Info/Visual" condition are asked to
predict each sessions’ gamble choice only being provided each target’s responses; then,
they are told they can revise their prediction by directly observing the target. While
they do not find that choices differ by treatment, they find evidence of gender stereotype
in predictions of others’ risk attitude when subjects are provided with the visual clues.
Particularly, predictions in the "Info/Visual" condition are significantly revised as more
risk taking for males and more risk averse for females.
Previous studies inferred gender difference in risk preferences and stereotyping in
predictions of others’ risk attitude from observed choices. However, none directly esti-
mated the risk attitude coefficients underlying a latent model of choice in a prediction
task. Chakravarty et al. (2011) structurally estimate risk attitude, however, they investi-
gate how individual risk preferences affect risky choices made on behalf of others, and
not how the formers affect predictions of risk attitude of others. Subjects are presented
with two MPLs in which they have to make choices having consequences on themselves
and on behalf on others. They find a widespread higher risk aversion when choices are
made on behalf of others. Only as control for the assessment of decisions made on behalf
of others, they ask participants to predict the average risky choice in the room both when
payoff have consequence on the decision maker and when the choice is made on behalf of
others. They report that average risk attitude on one’s money does not differ from beliefs
about average risk attitudes on one’s own money. The closest study to ours is that of
Conte et al. (2016). They adopted a maximum simulated likelihood approach to estimate
risk preferences under Expected Utility Theory and the alternative Rank-Dependent
model. However, they investigate how risk preferences are affected by emotions, and
not how gender affects both risk preferences and perceptions of others’ risk attitude.
Subjects are presented with 100 pairwise choices based on Hey (2001). Then, subjects
are randomly assigned to one of five treatments in which different types of emotions
are induced. They find females to be more risk averse than males and that different
emotions drive gender difference in risk preferences, i.e. sadness for males and joviality
for females.
The evidence from experimental designs is not clear-cut with respect to gender differ-
ence in risk preferences and to the role of gender in perceptions of others’ risk attitude.
Moreover, conclusions about prediction accuracy also depend on the type of risk measure
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considered. Second, experimental studies addressing the issue of predictions of others’
risk attitude have not considered the direct estimation of a structural model of a latent
choice process that best describes observed choices. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first study addressing predictions of others’ risk attitude by structurally specifying
utility and probability weighting function underlying EUT and non-EUT latent choice
processes. We employ the Random Lottery Pair Design to have multiple observations
for the same subject. This provides a richer dataset to characterize individual risk atti-
tude and compare it with predicted ones for both sexes after controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity 6.
2.3 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted with 115 students at Durham University in spring 2015.
There are two sets of decision tasks. The first set is used to elicit individual risk attitudes,
and the second set is used to elicit subjective beliefs about the risk attitudes of a randomly
selected subject in the experiment when only the gender of that person is known. These
two sets of decision tasks are similar and the subjects are paid according to their choices
in each set. The design allows us to test for gender difference in risk preferences and
stereotype bias in predictions of others’ risk attitude.
2.3.1 Eliciting individual risk attitude
To elicit individual risk attitudes, we employed a design based on the Random Lottery
Pair design developed by Hey & Orme (1994), albeit with different decision tasks. The
subjects were presented with 40 decision tasks in which they were asked to make a choice
between two lotteries, where 25 of those decision tasks included compound lotteries. The
employed payment protocol was the Random Lottery Incentive Mechanism: one decision
task was chosen at random and the preferred lottery was played out for payment in cash
at the end of the session.
The 40 decision tasks are based on those in Harrison & Swarthout (2012, 2014) and
Harrison et al. (2015). Each lottery has between one and three monetary prizes from
a set of seven possible outcomes of £0,£1,£2,£3.5,£4,£7 and £14. The probability of
each outcome in the lotteries is 0, 14 ,
1
2 ,
3
4 or 1. The 40 decision tasks are divided between
6Our study relates to that by Conte et al. (2016) in the structural estimation of a latent model of choice.
However, our procedure for estimating risk attitude is the Maximum Likelihood Estimation approach and
not the Maximum Simulated Likelihood approach.
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15 simple-compound lottery pairs (S-C), 15 simple-actuarially equivalent lottery pairs
(S-AE), and 10 actuarially equivalent-compound lottery pairs (AE-C) 7. With this design
we obtain multiple observations for each subject and we can estimate a latent structural
model of choice that describes observed choices 8. We identify individual risk attitudes
using the econometric specification described in Harrison & Rutstrom (2008).
Studies investigating predictions of risk attitude of others have not considered the
estimation of a model of the underlying (latent) choice process that best describes
risky choices. In our study, we consider both Expected Utility Theory (Von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1944) and the Rank-Dependent model (Quiggin, 1982). RDU captures the
idea that subjective perceptions of probabilities may be different from actual probability
distribution of random outcomes, even when the actual probability distribution is known
to the individual (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Gender difference in behavior under risk might depend not only on valuations of
outcomes but also on perceptions of probabilities. In particular, gender difference in
emotions - higher fear for females and higher anger for males - might explain gender
difference in probability optimism and pessimism (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). A study
related to this issue is Fehr-Duda et al. (2006): in estimating parameters of the choice
model of Prospect Theory by eliciting certainty equivalents, they found evidence of gender
difference in how probabilities are assessed: females are more susceptible to probability
weighting than males.
In our study, we investigate the existence of gender differences both in the degree
of utility curvature and the degree of probability pessimism and optimism, and we
characterize behavior in both risky choices and predictions of others’ risky choices under
EUT and RDU.
2.3.2 Eliciting beliefs about risk attitude of others
In the second set of decision tasks, subjects were asked to predict the choices of a
randomly chosen subject who participated in another session of the same experiment.
Particularly, they were asked to predict the choices made by one among ten students
from the same university - five males and five females - who participated in the first
session. Each target was assigned a random number, even for female and odd for male.
In order to determine the prediction target, participants were asked to roll a ten-sided
7The prospect parameters are in Appendix B
8This design allows us also to collect observations useful for a follow-up aimed at investigating gender
differences in violations of the Reduction of Compound Lotteries (ROCL) axiom.
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die. For instance, if a subject rolled the number 4, she knew that the target subject was a
female student whose risky choices were observed in a previous session. Each of the ten
target subjects’ answer sheets were kept in separate envelopes with the target subject’s
number visible on the envelope. Subjects were not given any information about the target
other than the target’s gender. Thus, gender was the only signal to form beliefs about the
target’s risky choices.
In order to elicit beliefs about risk attitudes of others, subjects were told that, at the
end of the task, one choice would be randomly selected. If their prediction was correct,
they would be paid £5, otherwise nothing. Participants could verify whether or not they
matched the target subject’s response by looking at the answer sheet contained in the
envelope given before starting the prediction task. The envelope was kept closed until
the end of the task. To control for potential order effects, in six of the 14 sessions we
reversed the order of the risk and the prediction tasks. Our instructions described the
typical scenario each subject would face to make risky choices 9.
Predictions of others’ risk attitude can be biased by available information of a target.
In particular, individuals’ behaviour can be driven by the salience of peculiar features
which activate the heuristic thinking of stereotypes (Wyer Jr & Wyer Jr, 1998). This is the
case of gender that is associated to devaluing beliefs (Goffman, 1963), such that females
(males) are more risk averse (taking) than males (females). Therefore, if individuals use
gender as a shortcut to assess others’ risk attitude, we expect to see predictions made by
both males and females to be biased by gender stereotype (Ames, 2004).
Prediction
If individuals use gender to form predictions of others’ risk attitude, females (males) will
be predicted to be more risk averse (taking) than males (females).
Among the 115 participants (Female: 67%, sd: 0.472; Age: 22.14, sd: 2.13) 10 were
recruited for the first session needed for creating the control group 10. All participants
received a £5 show up fee. At the end of the experiment, subjects completed a survey to
collect demographic characteristics 11. There were 14 experimental sessions in total and
each lasted approximately 1 hour. The average payment was £11.
9Instructions for both tasks are in Appendix B
10Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
11The survey is available in Appendix B.
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2.4 Statistical Model
To estimate risk attitudes two methods can be adopted. One involves the calculation of
bonds implied by observed choices and exploits utility functions with one parameter to
estimate. The other directly estimates a structural model of a latent process of choice
with a maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of risk attitudes specific to the
choice model considered (Harrison & Rutstrom, 2008). We adopt this latter approach to
characterize risk attitudes under models of choices alternative to the Expected Utility
Theory. We initially estimate risk attitudes under EUT because it is parsimonious.
Then, we characterize risk attitudes under RDU to capture probability pessimism and
optimism.
2.4.1 Expected Utility Theory
We assume a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function, defined as
U(y)= y
(1−r)
(1− r)
where r is the parameter to be estimated, and y is income. We estimate the utility
function by using maximum likelihood and a latent Expected Utility Theory (EUT)
structural model of choice. Let there be K possible outcomes in a lottery - in our case
K ≤ 3. Under EUT the probabilities for each outcome k, pk represent the objective
probabilities induced by the experimenter. The expected utility is simply the probability
weighted utility of each outcome in a lottery:
EUi =
∑
K=1,K
(pk ·uk)
Participants choose between two lotteries (left and right). Therefore, the latent index for
each lottery pair from which we estimate r is:
∇EU =EUR −EUL
This index is based on latent preferences and is linked to the observed choices using a
standard cumulative normal distribution function Φ(∇EU). The probit function trans-
forms any argument between ±∞ into 0 and 1.
The probability that lottery R is chosen is:
Prob(choose lottery R) = Φ(∇EU)
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The likelihood of the observed responses, assuming that individuals choose according
to EUT and CRRA utility, depends on the estimates of r given the above statistical
specification and the observed choices. The log-likelihood is
lnL(r; y, X )=∑ i[(lnΦ(∇EU) · I(yi = 1))+ ln(1−Φ(∇EU)) · I(yi =−1))]
where I(·) is the indicator function, yi = 1(−1) is the choice of the right (left) lottery in
task i, and X is a vector of observable characteristics, such as gender and treatments.
The parameter r is modelled as a linear function of the covariates in X. In the model, we
include the possibility that subjects make the behavioral error of not choosing a lottery
when its EU is larger than the EU of the other lottery. In particular, we include the error
specification proposed by Fechner and popularized by Hey & Orme (1994). The latent
index becomes
Prob(choose lottery R) = Φ(∇EU
µ
)
where µ> 0 is a noise parameter that reflects the fact that subjects state their preferences
with some error. The likelihood specification maximizes lnL(r,µ; y, X ) and we estimate r
and µ given the observations on y and X.
2.4.2 Rank Dependent Utility Theory
One alternative to EUT is to allow risk preferences to depend on the rank of the final
outcome by using weighted probabilities as decision weights when evaluating lotteries.
As before, we assume a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function. Under
RDU the objective probabilities for each outcome k, pk are replaced by subjective proba-
bilities wk. The expected utility is the probability weighted utility of each outcome in
each lottery is
EUi =
∑
K=1,K
(wk ·uk)
where
wi =ω(pi+ ...+ pn)−ω(pi+1+ ...+ pn)
for i =1,..., n-1, and ω(pi) for i=n. The subscript indicates that outcomes are ranked from
worst to best, and ω(p) is a probability weighting function. We assume the weighting
function proposed by Tversky & Kahneman (1992). This function has weights
ω(p)= p
γ
(pγ+ (1− p)γ)1/γ
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for
0< p< 1
that gives the weighting function an "inverse S-shape". The weighting function is
concave for small probabilities - implying overweighting of small probabilities - and
convex for large probabilities - implying underweighting of large probabilities. The
parameter γ informs about the curvature of the weighting function. In reviewing a
substantial amount of evidence, Gonzalez & Wu (1999) show that 0< γ< 1: the smaller
is γ, the more curved is the weighting function (the more probability weighting deviates
from linear weighting), the more responsive to changes in extreme probabilities is the
subject, the lower the crossover point. When γ is equal to 1, the model reduces to EUT.
The likelihood of the observed responses, assuming individuals choose according to
RDU and displaying a CRRA, depends on the estimates of r given the above statistical
specification and the observed choices. The log-likelihood is
lnL(r,ω,γ; y, X )=∑ i[(lnΦ(∇RDU) · I(yi = 1))+ ln(1−Φ(∇RDU)) · I(yi =−1))]
where I(·) is the indicator function, yi = 1(−1) is the choice of the right (left) lottery in
task i, and X is a vector of observable characteristics. As before, we include the error
specification proposed by Fechner and popularized by Hey & Orme (1994). The latent
index becomes
Prob(choose lottery R) =Φ(∇RDU
µ
)
The likelihood specification maximizes, then, lnL(r,ω,γ,µ; y, X ) to estimate r,ω,γ
and µ given the observations on y and X.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Aggregate Results
Figure 2.1 depicts the distribution of individual choices and predictions.
Subjects chose lottery Right 41.2% (.017) times over the 40 decision tasks. Predictions
of risk attitudes of others were measured by asking subjects to predict how another
student (female or male) chose in the individual task. Over the 40 prediction tasks
subjects predicted the target to choose lottery Right 43.9% (.016) times. A means test (t=
-1.1469, p-value= 0.2528) accepts the null hypothesis of no difference between individual
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Figure 2.1: Individual choices and Predictions
risky choices and predictions of Lottery Right. Descriptive analysis suggests no difference
between aggregate observed choices and predictions.
When we look at gender difference in individual choices, we find that females
(39.4%(.022)) and males (45.1%(.024)) chose, on average, the same percentages of Lottery
Right (t= 1.5530, p-value= 0.1235). Similarly, we find that females (43.2%(.020)) and
males (45.4% (.024)) made similar predictions about the target’s choice of lottery Right
(t= 0.6351, p-value= 0.5267 ).
Descriptive analysis suggests no gender difference between observed choices and
predictions.
2.5.2 Structural coefficients
Table 2.1 displays the maximum likelihood estimates of the EUT model applied to
participants’ behavior. The estimates are a linear function of the CRRA coefficient r for
the choices in the decision tasks. The dependent variable is the binary choice between
lottery Left and Right, and a standard probit function links the difference in expected
39
CHAPTER 2. PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS’ RISK ATTITUDE AND GENDER
STEREOTYPE
utility to the observed choices.
Results show that subjects are on average risk averse (the CRRA coefficient r > 0) and
that gender has no effect on risk aversion. The estimate for the dummy picking out the
risk aversion responses by females shows that the RRA is not significantly higher than
that of males. Similarly, we find that the RRA does not change when making decisions
in the risky choices task. On the other hand, we find that the estimate for the dummy
picking out the measurement error µ associated to females is 0.614 higher than that
associated to males.
Overall, when we assume subjects to choose according to EUT, we find that the
curvature of utility function is the same for females and males, but that the measurement
error is higher for females than for males.
Table 2.1: Statistical Model of Risk Aversion under EUT
VARIABLES r µ
Female 0.0815 0.614**
(0.141) (0.240)
Risk Choice Task 0.0726 0.062
(0.073) (0.147)
Constant 0.294** 1.318***
(0.092) (0.148)
Observations 8,400 8,400
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Maximum-likelihood estimates of CRRA utility function under EUT.
N= 8400 binary choices by 105 subjects in the risky choice and prediction tasks
Estimates corrected for clustering on the individual.
When we apply the RDU model to individuals’ behavior, we find evidence of probability
weighting (Table 2.2). The estimate γ is 0.820, and thus we reject the hypothesis that
subjects value probabilities linearly (i.e. that the estimate collapses to EUT, γ= 1). When
we look at the estimate of γ for female subjects, we find that the weighting function for
females is the same as that of males. Similarly, the γ associated to choices in the Risky
Choice Task is not different from that associated to predictions.
When allowing for probability weighting, we do not find gender difference in risk
attitudes. Although the estimate for the dummy picking out the risk aversion responses
by females shows that the RRA is 0.3 higher than that of males, this is not significant.
Similarly, the RRA does not change across the risky choices and the prediction tasks.
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Similarly to the coefficient estimated under EUT, we find that the estimate for the
dummy picking out the measurement error µ associated to females is higher than that
associated to males.
We can conclude that rank-dependent transformation of the probability weights
into decision weights better describes individuals’ behavior in risky choices than when
allowing for probability to be linear, since we find evidence of probability weighting.
Similarly to the estimates assuming EUT, we find gender difference neither in the
curvature of the utility function, nor in the probability weighting. On the other hand, we
do find that females display a higher measurement error than males both under EUT
and RDU models of choice.
These results are in contrast with the maximum likelihood estimates of Conte et al.
(2016) and Fehr-Duda et al. (2006), but are similar to those in the high-payoff treatments
of Holt & Laury (2002).
Table 2.2: Statistical Model of Risk Aversion under RDU
VARIABLES r γ µ
Female 0.303 -0.403 0.425*
(0.274) (0.353) (0.236)
Risk Choice Task 0.20 -0.286 -0.0614
(0.172) (0.206) (0.179)
Constant 0.421** 0.820*** 1.141***
(0.1666) (0.195) (0.185)
Observations 8,400 8,400 8,400
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Maximum-likelihood estimates of CRRA utility function under RDU.
N= 8400 binary choices by 105 subjects in the risky choice and prediction tasks
Estimates corrected for clustering on the individual.
2.5.3 Analysis of Prediction Bias
We start the analysis of stereotype bias in predictions by describing the relationship
between predictor and target gender. Figure 2.2 reports the predictions for lottery Right
by the gender of predictor and target, and the aggregate observed choices by males
and females. We observe that females predict their target to choose the same amount
of Lotteries Right for males (43.4%(.027) and females (42.9%(.031)) (t-test, t= 0.1173,
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p-value= 0.9069). On the other hand, we find that males predict females (40.3%(.037))
to choose significantly less Lotteries Right than males (49.6%(.031)) (t-test, t= 1.9258,
p-value= 0.0633 ).
Figure 2.2: Individual choices and Predictions by predictors’ gender
The latter result suggests that predictions by males are biased by gender stereotype.
To corroborate this insight, we analyse the difference between predicted and actual
choice by running an OLS model. Our index of Prediction Bias (PC - AC) is computed as
the difference between Predicted Choice by the predictor and Actual Choice. This latter
is computed as mean percentage of lottery Right chosen in each of the 40 tasks by the
gender population to which the predictor’s target belong.
When the index is negative (PC < AC), the predictor overpredicts the risk aversion of
the gender population to which the target belong. On the other hand, when the index is
positive (PC > AC), the predictor overpredicts the risk tolerance of the gender population
to which the target belong.
Table 2.3 shows the results of the OLS model producing two sets of regression
coefficients, one for female predictors and one for male predictors 12.
12We also estimated a Tobit model (see Appendix B) to account for the censoring of the index from -1 to
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Model a tests whether information that the target is Female results in a systematic
bias. We find that female predictors are not biased by gender information, as the coef-
ficient is not significant. On the other hand, we find that male predictors use gender
information inaccurately, as they predict female targets to be more risk averse than they
actually are.
In Model b we also test for another fundamental factor that might bias perceptions
of others’ risk attitude. In particular, we test for false consensus bias, that is whether
own behavior is projected in perceptions of others’ behavior (Ross et al., 1977). We,
therefore, include the predictor’s OwnChoice in the same task. If own risk preferences
bias predictions of others’ risk attitude, then more risk taking individuals will perceive
the target as more risk taking than she actually is. We find positive significant coefficients
for both female and male predictors. Therefore, unconditionally on gender, we find
predictors’ beliefs to be regressive on predictors’ own choices.
Table 2.3: Prediction Bias
(Femalea) (Femaleb) (Malea) (Maleb)
VARIABLES PC-AC PC-AC PC-AC PC-AC
FemaleTarget 0.00338 0.00318 -0.0843* -0.0777*
(0.0408) (0.0364) (0.0477) (0.0434)
PredictorChoice 0.263*** 0.289***
(0.0364) (0.0510)
Constant 0.0174 -0.0864*** 0.0790** -0.0541
(0.0270) (0.0248) (0.0305) (0.0340)
Observations 2,880 2,880 1,320 1,320
R-squared 0.000 0.078 0.009 0.112
Estimates corrected for clustering on the individual
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
1. The model produces similar results.
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2.6 Conclusions
This study shows that individuals use gender as informative device to make predictions
of others’ risk attitude. In a controlled laboratory environment, we presented subjects
with two incentive compatible risk aversion and prediction tasks in which subjects were
only informed about the target’s gender. While previous studies inferred risk attitude
and predicted risk attitude of others from observed choices, ours is the first attempt to
directly estimate the risk attitude coefficients underlying a latent model of choice that
best describes observed behavior.
RDU model of choice explains subjects’ behavior better than EUT, as we find evidence
of probability weighting. However, we find gender difference neither in the structural
estimates of the risk attitude coefficients underlying EUT nor in those underlying RDU.
We do find gender difference in measurement error: females state their choices with
a higher error than males. Therefore, in our study, beliefs that females are more risk
averse than males results to be a stereotype.
Our study shows that predictions of others’ risk attitude are inaccurate and reflect
gender stereotype. In particular, we find that males inaccurately overpredict females’
risk aversion.
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HONESTY UNDER THREAT
with Francesca Gino - Harvard Business School
and Marco Piovesan - University of Copenhagen
Team members may contribute to enforce a culture of corruption within orga-nizations and institutions when these are not optimally designed. In three ex-periments, we predict and find that individuals’ perception of dishonesty in
suboptimal group settings, like that of Weisel & Shalvi (2015), can be shaped by the
surrounding context. We find that honesty in groups is negatively affected when pun-
ishment among peers and by an uninvolved party is allowed. On the other hand, we
find that introducing a conflict of interest in suboptimal group settings slows down the
diffusion of collaborative dishonesty.
Keywords: Group Dishonesty; Punishment; Conflict of Interest; Loss Aversion
JEL classification: C92; D03
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3.1 Introduction
Dishonesty in the workplace is a widespread and multifaceted phenomenon: from embel-
lishing the truth on work performance, to stealing office supplies; from promised bonuses
and promotions that never arrive, to co-workers hiding valuable information. In the
last decade, economists and psychologists have shown that dishonesty is malleable and
dynamic (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Falk & Tirole, 2016). Contrary to what the traditional
approach to criminal behavior (Becker, 1968) suggests, dishonest decisions are influenced
by a much broader set of factors than just the costs and benefits associated with the act.
Individuals care about their self-image and act dishonestly to increase their earnings up
to the point in which they can mitigate the threat to the moral self (Mazar et al., 2008;
Bénabou & Tirole, 2011). To do so, they engage in self-serving justification (Shalvi et
al., 2011), especially when norms are ambiguous (Shalvi et al., 2015) and the dishonest
action benefits others (Wiltermuth, 2011). Individuals refrain from full dishonesty also
because they suffer from intrinsic costs of lying (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Gneezy,
2005; Abeler et al., 2014) and guilt aversion when they view honesty as the norm to
follow (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). However, the extent to which they perceive
honesty as a value can be shaped by the context. People are less lying averse when
financial incentives are negatively framed, because loss aversion changes the perception
about dishonesty (Grolleau et al., 2016). Similarly, institutions lead individuals to view
dishonesty as normal, as may happen within banks (Cohn et al., 2014) and societies with
high corruption levels (Gächter & Schulz, 2016).
While most research has been conducted on individuals’ decision to act dishonestly
and its underlying mechanisms, less we know about "collaborative dishonesty", that
is when the decision to act dishonestly involves more than one agent. This combined
dishonest action of two or more individuals is at the roots of extremely costly phenomena
for the whole society, such as corruption, bribery activities, financial and sport scandals.
To mitigate the propagation of negative externalities, it is fundamental to understand
whether the mechanisms behind individual dishonest behavior can also explain dis-
honesty in group settings, or whether alternative mechanisms are better predictors of
cooperative dishonesty.
Sutter (2009) suggests that dishonest behavior in groups is driven by lower level
of trust and higher strategic behavior than those of individuals. In particular, in the
setting of a sender-receiver game, he finds that team senders engage in deception through
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sophisticated truth-telling more than individual senders 1.
Conrads et al. (2013) show that diffusion of responsibility increases dishonest behavior.
Adding a team compensation scheme 2 to the die-rolling game (Fischbacher & Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013), they find that dishonesty is higher under the team incentives than under
the individual piece-rate scheme. Gino et al. (2013) further disentangle the effect of
"altruism" (Wiltermuth, 2011) on dishonest behavior by using problem-solving tasks in
which benefits are split with either another or two other students. They show that the
presence of a beneficiary promotes more dishonest behavior and allows to preserve the
moral self more than when dishonesty benefits the self only, suggesting that both social
concerns and self-justification drive dishonest behavior.
Weisel & Shalvi (2015) study dishonest collaboration with a "dyadic die-rolling"
paradigm in which individuals are forced by the institution to corrupt in order to increase
their earning. By manipulating the incentive structure such that outcomes are either
aligned, fixed, or higher for one of two players 3 , they show that the "moral" act of
cooperating on equal terms (i.e. outcomes are aligned) outweighs the costs associated
to lying, thus, promoting dishonesty in group settings. Recently, Kocher et al. (2016)
have showed that allowing individuals in the group to communicate promotes dishonesty
as in the payoff commonality framework of Weisel & Shalvi (2015). By adding the
possibility to exchange information in a chat before making the decision in the die-rolling
task (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013), they show that communication shapes the
perception of which norm to follow within group settings. Taken together, these findings
suggest that different contextual features might increase dishonesty in group settings.
In particular, when cooperation (equally) benefits other individuals and communication
1 Senders are informed about the payoffs of two options: option A favors receivers, while option B
favors senders. Then, senders choose the message to disclose to receivers: i) "option A will earn the receiver
more money than option B", ii) "option B will earn the receiver more money than option A". Receivers
choose which of the two options is implemented for payment. In this setting, the distribution of deception
is defined in four types. "Benevolent truthtellers" send the message about the option that benefits receivers
(A) and expect receivers to implement it (A). "Sophisticated truth-tellers" send the message about the
option that benefits receivers (A) and expect receivers not to trust them, thus to implement the other
option (B). "Benevolent liars" do not suffer from lying costs but care about receivers: they send the message
about the option that benefits them more than receivers (B), but expect receivers not to trust them, thus to
implement the other option (A). "Liars" send the message about the option that benefits them more than
receivers (B) and expect the receivers to implement it (B).
2The sum of the numbers reported by two randomly matched individuals is split equally between the
two individuals.
3Aligned outcomes: if they get a double players get the same payoff equal to the number reported. A(B)
high(low): A(B) gets a fixed high(low) payoff if they get a double independently on the number reported,
while B(A) gets the value of the double. A(B) fixed: A(B) gets a fixed payoff regardless of whether they get
a double or not.
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is allowed, individuals change their perception of honesty as norm to follow and engage
in higher dishonesty.
By shedding light on the effect of three contextual changes on perceptions of col-
laborative dishonesty, our study contributes to previous research showing that when
individuals are given the incentive to dishonestly cooperate to equally share benefits they
cheat more. We conduct three laboratory experiments at the Laboratory of Experimental
Economics of the University of Copenhagen using the "dyadic die-rolling paradigm" of
Weisel & Shalvi (2015). In the first experiment, we study the effect that second and
third-party punishment has on preventing or promoting dishonesty in groups. On the
one hand, the threat of punishment may limit the willingness to violate moral rules:
each agent may act honestly out of the fear that the other player can punish her if she
believes that she was dishonest. On the other hand, the threat of punishment can induce
honest people to act dishonestly: punishment can represent a tool to create a social norm
of dishonesty and/or make "rationalization" easier for those people that are looking for
an excuse for their dishonest intentions. In the second experiment, we study the effect
of introducing a conflict of interest in collaborating dishonestly. Introducing unequal
rewards might make it more difficult to coordinate on a tacit agreement, since players
might be concerned about different motives, such as inequality aversion, than profit-
maximization only. Finally, the third experiment extends the findings from Grolleau et al.
(2016) and Schindler & Pfattheicher (2016) on the detrimental effect that loss aversion
might have on perceptions of dishonesty in group settings.
We find that allowing for punishment mechanisms in suboptimal group settings has
a detrimental effect on normative perceptions of corruption. We also find that adding a
conflict of interest in group settings that give the incentive to corrupt slows down the
diffusion of collaborative dishonesty. Finally, we show that the frame of group settings is
not crucial for promoting collaborative dishonesty when these are not designed optimally.
3.2 Method
A total of 268 students from the University of Copenhagen took part in the study (female:
52.7%, sd. 0.50; age: 26.02, sd. 0.21). 50 were assigned to the Baseline condition, 46 to the
Second Party Punishment Condition, 78 to the Third Party Punishment, 46 to the Conflict
of Interest condition, and 48 to the Loss Frame condition. Participants were recruited
through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) to the Laboratory of Experimental Economics of the
same University in even groups for the conditions Baseline, Second Party Punishment,
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Conflict of Interest and Loss Frame. For the condition Third Party Punishment they
were recruited in groups of three.
The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher,
2007). Upon their arrival to the laboratory, participants were randomly allocated to
cubicles and asked to privately read the instructions. Before starting the experiment,
they were asked to complete control questions verifying their understanding of the
experiment. Participants received on average DKK 112 in addition to a show-up fee of
DKK 50. Each session lasted on average 1 hour and 30 minutes.
In the first stage of all experiments, participants are presented with the experiment-
specific variants of the "dyadic die-rolling paradigm" from Weisel & Shalvi (2015). Par-
ticipants are randomly paired and assigned to roles of Player A or B. First, Player A
rolls the die and reports the outcome. After that, Player B is informed about player A’s
report, she rolls the die and reports the outcome. This task is repeated for 20 periods,
keeping the role and the pair fixed for all the periods. If Player A and B report the
same number (i.e., a "double") each participant earns an amount of points equal to the
number reported multiplied by twenty (for instance 120 points for a "double six"); zero
points otherwise. Die rolls are truly private and misreporting is possible. The expected
probability of rolling a double in a single trial is 1/6 (16.7%). Any significant statistical
deviation can be interpreted as an evidence of cheating. Each player is informed about
her report, the counterpart’s report and the payoff associated from the previous periods.
The experimenter pays participants for one of the 20 periods, randomly selected at the
end of the experiment. Each point corresponds to 1 DKK. In our study, we modify Weisel
& Shalvi (2015)’s paradigm by giving participants a fixed endowment of 46 points at the
beginning of each period independently on the outcome of the die-rolling task.
After completing the dyadic die-rolling task, participants are presented with the
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto & Filippin, 2013) and the Personality Traits
questionnaire (Ashton & Lee, 2009). The BRET is a choice-based elicitation method that
asks subjects to decide the point at which they prefer to stop collecting 100 available
boxes, one of which contains a bomb. Subjects receive an earning in DKK which is equal
to the number of boxes collected, however if one of those contains the bomb they receive
nothing. The cumulative probability of collecting the bomb increases linearly from 0.01 to
1. This setting allows to derive a measure for risk preferences from the position in which
the subject stopped, i.e. the less boxes participants collect, the more risk averse they
are. The Personality Traits questionnaire provides us with six measures of personality
traits: Honesty-Humility, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Openness
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to Experience. Participants are asked to state how much they agree on a scale from 1 to
5 to 60 non-incentivized statements. Finally, they are asked to complete a demographic
survey.
3.3 Experiment 1
In this experiment, we study the effect of providing a punishment mechanism in set-
tings that give individuals no other option to increase their benefits than to corrupt.
This experiment contends that second party and third party punishment mechanisms
exacerbate the negative side of contexts that embed normative conflicts.
Previous studies on settings characterized by normative conflicts (Nikiforakis et al.,
2012; Xiao & Kunreuther, 2016) show that peer punishment is less effective in enforcing
cooperation in public good settings. Ours examines cooperation in a setting that requires
to violate honesty norm and that, in turn, embeds two plausible rules about how one
should behave: cooperate against honesty or acting honestly while hurting the group.
There are two arguments that provide us with two alternative predictions. The first
relates to intrinsic preference for honesty (Abeler et al., 2014): some may believe that
the group should increase welfare only through honest procedures, because they have
a strong preference for honesty. Thus, we predict that individuals with preference for
honesty sanction to enforce the norm of honesty. If they are the majority, there will be a
negative effect on collaborative dishonesty.
The second relates to self-serving justification mechanisms and social concerns (Shalvi
et al., 2011; Gino et al., 2013), and suboptimal institutions (Gächter & Schulz, 2016):
suboptimal settings that provide individuals with the prospect of benefiting others
against ethical values, on the one hand, allow to preserve the moral self and, on the
other, shape over time individual ethical values. Thus, we predict individuals to punish
to enforce dark cooperation. This will have a positive effect on collaborative dishonesty.
If only involved parties were given the opportunity to punish, we would not be able
to isolate different forces that shape norm enforcement, as sanctions can be motivated
by non-normative motives such as retaliation. On the other hand, giving the option to
sanction to a third party that is not affected by the norm violation "reveals the truly
normative standards of behavior" (Fehr & Fischbacher (2004): p.65). Therefore, third-
party punishment enables us to shed light on the normative conflict characterizing our
setting.
As before, there are two arguments that provide us with two predictions. Third-
50
3.3. EXPERIMENT 1
parties might sanction when players violate honesty, because they have internalized a
norm of honesty (Abeler et al., 2014). Thus, we predict third-parties with internalized
norms of honesty to sanction violations of honesty. At the same time, institutions may
shape individual’s honesty (Gächter & Schulz, 2016). Dishonest cooperation might appear
justifiable also to the eye of an uninvolved party if the context does not give other option
to increase benefits than through unethical procedures. We predict suboptimal context to
shape third parties’ perceptions of ethical values and to trigger sanctions of violations of
dishonest cooperation.
To address these predictions we implement a between-subject design with two treat-
ments (Second Party Punishment and Third Party Punishment). In our Baseline Condi-
tion 4 (Baseline, 2 sessions, 50 subjects) participants are endowed with a fixed amount
of 46 points. In our Condition (Second Party Punishment, 2 sessions, 46 subjects) each
player -after having observed the counterpart’s report- can "spend" 6 of these 46 points
to "punish" the other player 5.
In our Third Party Condition (Third Party Punishment, 3 sessions, 78 subjects) we
add a third player with a punishment option to our Baseline condition. Only Player
C - after having observed what Player A and Player B report - can "spend" 6 points
of her endowment to "punish" the other players. Player C does not participate in the
"dyadic die-rolling paradigm" and can earn only her fixed endowment. Therefore, we give
Player C an additional endowment of 12 points to avoid punishment actions motivated
by perceived unfairness. The additional endowment is equal to the expected value of
winning an amount of points for Player A and Player B from participating in the "dyadic
die-rolling paradigm" 6.
3.3.1 Results
3.3.1.1 Collaborative and Individual Dishonesty
Figure 3.1 provides a joint representation of individual and collaborative dishonesty.
In our setting, participants earn money only if they report a "double". The number of
doubles are represented by the dots in the diagonal, that is the joint report of Player A
and Player B in a single period for the two treatments (Panel a, Second Party Punishment,
23 pairs x 20 periods = 460 dots; Panel b, Third Party Punishment, 26 pairs x 20 periods
= 520 dots; Panel c, Baseline, 25 pairs x 20 periods = 500 dots). Figure 3.1 shows that
4The Baseline Condition is the same in all the three experiments.
5Every point allocated for punishment decreases the payoff of the other player of 2 points.
6[(1/6 ·20+1/6 ·40+1/60 ·60+1/6 ·80+1/6 ·100+1/6 ·120)/6]= 11.67∼ 12 points
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Players dishonestly collaborated. In fact, the average percentages of reported doubles in
Baseline (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z= 4.361, p-value=0.0000), Second Party Punishment
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z= 3.991, p-value=0.0001) and the Third Party Punishment
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z= 4.311, p-value= 0.0000) are significantly higher than the
average percentage assuming honesty (16.7%).
However, the average percentage of doubles in Second Party Punishment (69,6%,
sd:0.323; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=-1.000, p-value=0.3174) and in Third Party Pun-
ishment (64,6%, sd:0.316; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z= -0.409, p-value=0.6829) are not
different from that in Baseline (56,6%, sd: 0.343).
The side histograms in Figure 3.1 show the distribution of numbers reported for each
player. The not-uniform distributions suggest that both players reported the number
dishonestly. In fact, both players A and B report a number significantly higher than
the expected 3.5 assuming honesty (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: A in Baseline: z= 4.349,
p-value 0.000; A in Second Party Punishment: z = 4.110, p-value 0.000; A in Third Party
Punishment: z=3.876, p-value 0.0001; B in Baseline: z= 4.120, p-value 0.000; B in Second
Party Punishment: z= 4.046, p-value 0.0001; B in Third Party Punishment: z= 3.956,
p-value=0.0001).
Player A in Second Party Punishment (4.65: sd: 0.90, Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=
1.394, p-value= 0.1633) and in Third Party Punishment (4.86: sd: 1.12, Wilcoxon rank-
sum test: z= 0.574, p-value= 0.5658) report a number that does not differ from that
reported by Player A in Baseline (5.064: sd: 0.932).
Similarly, Player B in Second Party Punishment (4.56: sd: 0.84, Wilcoxon rank-sum
test: z= -0.620, p-value= 0.5352) and in Third Party Punishment (4.65: sd: 1.07, Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: z= -0.539, p-value= 0.5897) report a number that does not differ from
that reported by Player B in Baseline (4.49: sd: 0.98).
3.3.1.2 Analysis of Types
Fig 3.2 and Fig 3.3 provide a joint representation of all decisions made by each group
in Baseline, Second Party Punishment and Third Party Punishment. They show that
individual behaviour is heterogeneous across groups. In particular, three main types
of behaviour can be observed: i) brazen (individuals who reported 6 across all the 20
periods); ii) dishonest, i.e. individuals who reported on average a number larger than the
honest benchmark but less than the maximum (6) across the 20 periods; iii) honest, i.e.
individuals who reported on average truthfully (3.5) across the 20 periods.
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Figure 3.1: Second Party and Third Punishment - Baseline
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The proportion of Brazen Players across conditions is homogeneous. In particular,
the proportion of Brazen Players A in Second Party Punishment (17%(0.39)) and Third
Party Punishment (31%(0.47)) are the same as the proportion of Brazen Player A in
Baseline (32%(0.48), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test 2P: z = 1.155, p-value = 0.2479; 3P: z =
0.094, p-value 0.9253). Similarly, the proportion of Brazen Players B in Second Party
Punishment (9%(0.29)) and Third Party Punishment (23%(0.43)) is not different from
that in Baseline (16%(0.37), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test 2P: test z = 0.756, p-value = 0.4494;
3P: z = -0.630 p-value = 0.5286).
As for Brazen Players, the proportion of Dishonest Players is homogeneous across
conditions. The proportion of dishonest Players A in Second Party Punishment (74%(0.45))
and Third Party Punishment (46%(0.51)) is not different from that in Baseline (64%(0.49),
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test 2P: z = -0.732, p-value= 0.4639; 3P: z = 1.268, p-value= 0.2049).
Similarly, the proportion of Dishonest Player B in Second Party Punishment (82%(0.39))
and Third Party Punishment (65%(0.49)) is not different from that in Baseline (72%(0.46),
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test 2P: test z = -0.864, p-value = 0.3873; 3P: z = 0.504, p-value =
0.6143).
Interestingly, while the proportion of Honest Player A in Second Party Punishment
(9%(0.29)) does not differ from that in Baseline (4%(0.2), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test 2P:
z = -0.664, p-value = 0.5065), we find that the proportion of Honest Player A in Third
Party Punishment (23%(0.43), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test 3P: z = -1.960, p-value = 0.0500)
is significantly higher than that in Baseline. This suggests that introducing a monitoring
mechanism, such as a third party, elicits more honest types than in Baseline: Player A
fears to be punished by the third party if she does not report honestly. On the contrary,
the proportion of Honest Player B in Second Party Punishment (9%(0.29)) and Third
Party Punishment (12%(0.33)) does not differ from that in Baseline (12%(0.33), Wilcoxon
Rank Sum test 2P: z = 0.370 p-value= 0.7110; 3P: z = 0.051 p-value = 0.9596).
3.3.1.3 Evolution of Collaborative Dishonesty
Figure 3.4 shows the effect of Second Party Punishment and Third Party Punishment on
collaborative dishonesty over the 20 periods of the game. It shows that in Second Party
Punishment and in Third Party Punishment collaborative dishonesty is higher than in
Baseline after the second half of the game.
We complement this insight with a random individual effect7 probit regression
7Throughout the study we implemented random effects models to capture between-subject differences
and between-subject heterogeneity.
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Figure 3.2: Decisions by Groups Across Periods: Baseline
analysis of Player B’s decision to report a double in Second Party Punishment and
Third Party Punishment to isolate the time effect (Table 3.1). We include a dummy
for a block of ten periods (11-20), using the first 10 periods as baseline. We add the
dummies for the treatments Second Party Punishment (SP) and Third Party Punishment
(TP). Finally, we add the interactions between Second Party Punishment and 11-20, and
Third Party Punishment and 11-20 to capture the combined effect. Results show that
collaborative dishonesty is likely to increase over time compared to Baseline, as the
coefficients associated to 11-20 in Second Party Punishment and Third Party Punishment
are significantly positive. Wald test for the null hypothesis that the difference between
the coefficients Second Party Punishment x 11-20 and Third Party Punishment x 11-20 is
zero indicates that the coefficients have the same effect on collaborative dishonesty (χ21 =
0.18, p> χ21 =0.6727).
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Figure 3.3: Decisions by Groups Across Periods: Second Party Punishment and Third
Party Punishment
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Figure 3.4: Punishment: Doubles over period
3.3.1.4 Analysis of punishment
In Second Party Punishment only 9,46% (sd:0.25) of players decided to punish the other
player and when they used punishment they used it moderately at the same extent: on
average Player A received 3.15 points and B received 2.48 points (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test: z -0.179, p-value= 0.8578).
In Second Party Punishment players take part in the die-rolling paradigm, and
their punishment decisions might be predicted by their preference for dishonesty. As
a result, we conduct two separate random individual effect ordered probit regression
analyses with the decision to punish a positive amount or not as a dependent variable
by Player A and Player B in Second Party Punishment. As independent variables, we
include the player’s decision and the counterpart’s decision to report brazenly or not.
We define the variable Brazen A as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if Player A
reports 6, zero otherwise. The variable Brazen B is a dummy variable taking the value
1 if Player B reports a double, zero otherwise. Table 3.2 shows that the more Player B
is brazen, i.e. reports a double, the less she punishes the counterpart. This suggests
that the more Player B gest along with Player A by accepting her action, the less likely
is her willingness to punish her counterpart. Hence, reporting a double is a signal of
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Table 3.1: Random individual effect probit regression analysis of Double decisions:
Second- Party and Third-Party Punishment
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Double Double
SP 0.299 0.113
(0.411) (0.425)
TP 0.149 -0.0781
(0.396) (0.409)
11-20 0.307*** 0.0202
(0.0840) (0.141)
11-20 x SP 0.396*
(0.213)
11-20 x TP 0.486**
(0.199)
Constant 0.369 0.509*
(0.289) (0.296)
Observations 1,480 1,480
Number of id 74 74
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
collaboration and dilutes peer-punishment.
In Third Party Punishment, the percentage of uninvolved parties (23,852% sd: 0.24)
that decided to punish the other players is higher than players who punished in Second
Party Punishment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z= -4.413, p-value= 0.0000). However, as
for Second Party Punishment, third parties sanctioned Player A and B moderately and
at the same extent (A: 2.20 points; B 2.01 points; Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z 0.402,
p-value: 0.6876).
To address the normative motivations behind punishment decisions in each treat-
ment, we separate the case when players systematically sanctioned Player B for violating
honesty norm - hence when she reported a double - and for acting against dark coopera-
tion - hence when she did not report a double.
Within Second Party Punishment, we observe that the percentage of Player A that
punished Player B for violating honesty (3.9%sd : 0.13) is significantly higher than
the percentage of Player A that punished for violating dark cooperation (1.7%sd : 0.08)
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z= 2.232, p-value: 0.0256). Similarly, within Third Party
Punishment, we observe that the percentage of third parties that punished Player B for
violating honesty (15.8%sd : 0.19) is significantly higher than the percentage of third
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parties that punished for violating dark cooperation (8%sd : 0.13) (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test: z= 1.972, p-value: 0.0487).
This suggests that those who decided to consistently punish Player B were motivated
by normative concerns in favour of honesty. However, the actual use of punishment for
consistently violating a norm was too scarce to enforce honesty in this suboptimal group
setting.
In Second Party Punishment, the almost null use of punishment for norm violations
suggests that individuals perceive a normative conflict, but the fear of retaliation provides
them with a tool to accept dishonest cooperation as a norm to earn some benefits. In
Third Party Punishment, the scarce use of punishment for norm violations suggests
that also uninvolved parties are uncertain about which is the right rule to enforce. As
a result, third party becomes a non-credible monitoring mechanism to enforce honesty.
Building on the insight from the analysis of types that the presence of a third party
elicits more honest Players A than in Baseline, we can conclude that if third parties were
more credible, they would be able to crowd-in more honest types.
Overall, these results suggest that this suboptimal group setting shapes the norma-
tive perception of dark cooperation at cost of honesty.
Table 3.2: Random individual effect probit regression analysis of Punishment decisions
Player A Player B
VARIABLES Pun Dec Pun Dec
Brazen A 0.177 -0.0417
(0.483) (0.307)
Brazen B 0.970 -0.693*
(0.887) (0.372)
Constant -5.834*** -3.215***
(1.054) (0.566)
Observations 460 460
Number of id 23 23
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.3.2 Discussion
Results of Experiment 1 show that introducing the norm enforcement mechanism of
second-party and third-party punishment exacerbates the negative effects of suboptimal
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group settings (i.e. collaborative dishonesty), that is settings that give individuals no
other option to increase their benefits than to corrupt. This is in line with recent evidence
(Meier et al., 2016) showing that norm enforcement mechanisms augment the negative
consequences of suboptimal institutions, such as those characterized by a culture of
Mafia. Our results are also in line with evidence that suboptimal institutions shapes
individual ethical values (Gächter & Schulz, 2016), since both involved parties and
third-parties barely use punishment to enforce a rule.
The same tool, punishment, that can be used to foster group cooperation to contribute
to public goods (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), can produce more cooperation against ethical
values.
3.4 Experiment 2
So far, we reported that suboptimal group settings promote collaborative dishonesty
when individuals are forced to coordinate to equally share benefits. One explanation
behind the diffusion of collaborative dishonesty is the ability of groups to make better
decisions than individuals. Groups are more successful in strategic interactions (Kocher
& Sutter, 2005; Sutter, 2009) and learn faster how to coordinate on efficient actions,
because they are more concerned about profit-maximization than individuals (Feri et al.,
2009).
In our Baseline, efficiency is increasing as the group lies down the most profitable
outcome. As a result, groups converge fast to reporting the maximum value, i.e. the most
efficient action 8, because it guarantees the maximum payoff to all group members.
In Experiment 2 (Conflict of Interest, 2 sessions, 46 subjects), we add a mecha-
nism that might deter diffusion of collaborative dishonesty enhanced by those profit-
maximization and efficiency concerns which are proper of groups. In particular, we
introduce an asymmetric payoff scheme to create a conflict of interest in reporting a
double (Table 3.3).
As for the Baseline, players have the incentive to report a double to earn an additional
amount of money to the initial endowment. However, in this setting, any combined action
is an efficient equilibrium and yields different levels of inequality between one’s and her
counterpart’s payoff: Player A has an incentive to report small values, while Player B is
better off if Player A reports high values.
8Efficiency is here defined as the sum of payoffs (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004)
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Table 3.3: Payoff scheme in Conflict of Interest
Player A’s outcome Player B’s outcome Player A’s Earning Player B’s Earning
1 1 120 20
2 2 100 40
3 3 80 60
4 4 60 80
5 5 40 100
6 6 20 120
If individuals in the group are purely concerned about maximizing the group payoff,
they will coordinate on the combined action yielding the highest payoff to Player A,
who is in the position of first mover, and the lowest but still positive payoff to Player B.
However, individuals might make dishonest decisions not only to maximize profit, but
also because they are motivated by inequality aversion (Abeler et al., 2016). Based on
this insight, we predict that if individuals are inequality averse, they will converge to
the combined dishonest action that minimizes the difference between their own and the
counterpart’s payoff. We also predict that if individuals are inequality averse, they will
converge slower to collaborative dishonesty, because they are more concerned about how
their stakes compare to their counterpart’s ones than about profit maximization. Thus,
conflict of interest might dilute the diffusion of collaborative dishonesty, by awakening
social preferences at the expenses of the profit-maximization mindset enhanced by group
settings.
3.4.1 Results
3.4.1.1 Collaborative and Individual Dishonesty
Figure 3.5 provides a joint representation of individual and collaborative dishonesty.
As before, we look at the average percentages of doubles to investigate collaborative
dishonesty, since participants earn money only if they report a "double". The number
of doubles are represented by the dots in the diagonal, that is the joint report of Player
A and Player B in a single period in Conflict of Interest (Panel a, Conflict of Interest, 23
pairs x 20 periods = 460 dots)), in the simulation assuming honesty (Panel b, Decisions
assuming honesty, 23 pairs x 20 periods = 460 dots) and in the Baseline (Panel c).
Differently from Decisions assuming honesty, the number of doubles (the number of
dots in the diagonal) in Conflict of Interest are not random, but concentrated around
the values 3 and 4. This can be better observed in Figure 3.6 in which doubles are
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concentrated around the value 3.5.
Figure 3.5 shows that Players dishonestly collaborated. In fact, the average percent-
ages of reported doubles in Conflict of Interest (50.2% sd:0.26) is significantly higher than
the average percentage assuming honesty (16.7%)(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z= 4.110,
p-value=0.0000). However, it is not significantly lower than that in Baseline (56.6% sd:
0.343)(Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z= 0.560, p-value= 0.5753).
The side histograms in Figure 3.5 show the distribution of numbers reported for each
player in Conflict of Interest (Panel a), in the simulation of Decision assuming honesty
(Panel b), and in Baseline (Panel c). The distribution of numbers reported for each player
in Conflict of Interest is the same as if they reported honestly. In fact, while in Baseline
the honesty benchmark against which compares Players’ reported values is 3.5 ([1 + 2
+ 3 + 4 + 5 + 6]/6), in Conflict of Interest 3.5 represents an indicator of collaborative
dishonesty.
On average, we find that Player A (3.08, sd:0.38) in Conflict of Interest reports a
number significantly smaller than 3.5 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: A : z= -3.791, p-
value 0.0002). On the other hand, Player B (3.56, sd:0.32) reports a value equal to the
collaborative dishonesty indicator 3.5 (B in Conflict of Interest: z= 1.127, p-value 0.2596).
Compared with the Baseline, both Player A and Player B report a number significantly
smaller than Player A and Player B in Baseline (A, Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z= 5.835,
p-value=0.0000; and B, Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z= 3.711, p-value=0.0002).
3.4.1.2 Analysis of Types
Results presented so far suggest that individuals in group settings are not always profit-
maximizers, but also inequity averse when presented with unequal rewards: in Conflict
of Interest individuals in the group converge to the combined action that minimizes
difference between players’ payoff.
To corroborate this insight, we compare the percentage of profit-maximizers in Base-
line and Conflict of Interest. Fig 3.7 provides a joint representation of all decisions made
by each group in Baseline and Conflict of Interest. It shows that that the percentage of
Player A (20%(0.09)) and Player B (16.9%(0.08)) in Conflict of Interest who reported the
value that maximizes their payoff, is significantly lower than the percentage of Player A
(61%(0.34)) and Player B (44%(0.34)) in Baseline who reported 6 (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test: A z= 4.630, p-value 0.0000; B z = 3.372, p-value=0.0007).
We, then, conduct a within-treatment analysis of the percentages of profit-maximizer
and inequality averse players, these latter defined as individuals who get disutility when
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Figure 3.5: Conflict of Interest and Decision Assuming Honesty - Baseline
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Doubles in Baseline and Conflict of Interest
their payoff deviates from the average payoff (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). Building on this
definition, our measure of inequality aversion is the percentage of Players who reported
either 3 or 4.
Fig 3.7 (panel B) shows that both the percentages of inequality averse Players A
(41%(0.147)) and Players B (37.9%(0.08)) are significantly higher than the percentage
of profit-maximizer Players A and Players B (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; A: z = 18.571,
p-value = 0.0000; B: z = 18.579, p-value = 0.0000).
These results suggest that Conflict of Interest awakens social preferences at the
expenses of the profit-maximization mindset which is proper of groups.
3.4.1.3 Evolution of Collaborative Dishonesty
Figure 3.8 shows the effect of Conflict of Interest on collaborative dishonesty over the
20 periods of the game. It shows that in Conflict of Interest collaborative dishonesty is
substantially lower than in Baseline since the initial periods. However, doubles reported
in Conflict of Interest seem to be similar to those reported in Baseline in the second half
of the game.
We investigate this insight with a random individual effect probit regression analysis
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Figure 3.7: Decisions by Groups Across Periods: Baseline and Conflict of Interest
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Figure 3.8: Conflict of Interest: Doubles over period
of Player B’s decision to report a double to isolate the time effect (Table 3.4). We include
a dummy for a block of ten periods (11-20), using the first 10 periods as baseline. We add
the dummy for the treatment Conflict of Interest (CI). Finally, we add the interaction
between Conflict of Interest and 11-20 to capture the combined effect. Results show that
collaborative dishonesty is likely to increase in the last periods, but that the effect of
Conflict of Interest is negative enough to make collaborative dishonesty less likely over
time.
3.4.2 Discussion
Results of Experiment 2 indicate that introducing a conflict of interest in group settings
mitigates the diffusion of negative externalities (i.e. diffusion of corruption) associated to
teams with a joint stake in dishonest decisions. Adding a mechanism that enhances social
comparison within the group awakens individuals’ concerns for inequality aversion and
decreases those for profit-maximization which are proper of groups. This way, individuals
converge more slowly to a combined dishonest action.
While in the baseline individuals in groups coordinate fast on efficient outcomes
because they are concerned about profit-maximization (Feri et al., 2009), when faced
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Table 3.4: Random individual effect probit regression analysis of Double decisions:
Conflict of Interest
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Double Double
CI -0.395 -0.574*
(0.331) (0.344)
11-20 0.215** 0.0192
(0.0948) (0.139)
11-20 x CI 0.368*
(0.190)
Constant 0.341 0.437*
(0.239) (0.245)
Observations 960 960
Number of Individuals 48 48
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
with unequal rewards they become more concerned about how their individual stake
differs from that of the counterpart, rather than about profit-maximization. As a result,
they take more time to converge to a combined action.
Our results show that introducing conflict of interest in a setting in which individuals
have a joint stake in corruption creates noise within the group by making individuals
more focused about reducing inequality and less concerned about increasing earnings
through collaborative dishonesty. Results from Experiment 2 also suggests that, while
lowering the diffusion of collaborative dishonesty, conflict of interest makes individual
dishonesty hard to be detected. Conflict of interest gives individuals the incentive to
report as if they were honest, with the joint stake to report the same outcome. In this
setting, individual behavior is not a good predictor for dishonesty, while is so collaborative
dishonesty.
3.5 Experiment 3
Our third experiment examines whether loss aversion further promotes dishonesty in
group settings. Building on Grolleau et al. (2016) and Schindler & Pfattheicher (2016)
findings on the detrimental effect that loss aversion has on individual honesty, we test
how it interacts with group settings that promote collaborative dishonesty. Therefore, in
Experiment 3 we add to the "dyadic die-rolling" paradigm the threat of loss aversion. The
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Loss Frame Condition (Loss Frame, 2 sessions, 48 subjects) is implemented by providing
participants at the beginning of each of period the maximum payoff attainable from
reporting a double in the Baseline condition (i.e. reporting a double of 6 gives 120). In the
instructions, participants were told that they could lose all points if they do not report a
double (excluding the Baseline endowment of 46), while they could lose a certain amount
of points if they report a double as shown in the column Loss Frame in Table 3.5 9.
Table 3.5: Baseline and Loss frame payoff schedule and final profit
Player A’s outcome Player B’s outcome Baseline Baseline Profit Loss Frame Loss Frame Profit
1 1 20 46+20=66 -100 166-100=66
2 2 40 46+40=86 -80 166-80=86
3 3 60 46+60=106 -60 166-60=106
4 4 80 46+80=126 -40 166-40=126
5 5 100 46+100=146 -20 166-20=146
6 6 120 46+120=166 0 166-0=166
3.5.1 Results
3.5.1.1 Collaborative and Individual Dishonesty
Figure 3.9 provides a joint representation of individual and collaborative dishonesty.
As before, to investigate collaborative dishonesty, we look at the amount of doubles.
The number of doubles are represented by the dots in the diagonal, that is the joint
report of Player A and Player B in a single period for the Loss Frame (Loss Frame, 24
pairs x 20 periods = 480 dots) and Baseline conditions. Figure 3.9 shows that Players
dishonestly collaborated. In fact, the average percentages of reported doubles in Loss
Frame is significantly higher than the average percentage assuming honesty (16.7%)
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z= 4.296, p-value=0.0000). However, the average percentage
of doubles in Loss Frame (69.8%, sd:0.28) is not different from that in Baseline (56,6%,
sd: 0.343) (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z= -1.203, p-value= 0.2288).
The side histograms in Figure 3.9 show the distribution of numbers reported for each
player. The not-uniform distributions suggest that both players reported the number
dishonestly. As for the Baseline, both players A and B in Loss Frame report a number
significantly higher than the expected 3.5 assuming honesty (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:
A: z= 4.202, p-value 0.000; B: z= 3.758, p-value=0.0002).
9e loss = egain+pigain,max = 46+120= 166
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Figure 3.9: Loss Frame - Baseline
Player A in Loss Frame (4.79: sd: 0.90) report a number that does not differ from that
reported by Player A in Baseline (5.064: sd: 0.932) (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z= 1.296,
p-value= 0.1949).
Similarly, Player B in Loss Frame (4.59: sd: 0.94) report a number that does not differ
from that reported by Player B in Baseline (4.49: sd: 0.98) (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=
-0.260, p-value=0.7947).
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3.5.1.2 Analysis of Types
Fig 3.10 provides a joint representation of all decisions made by each group in Baseline
and Loss Frame. It shows that individual behaviour across groups can be categorized
into three main types of behaviour can be observed: i) brazen (individuals who reported
6 across all the 20 periods); ii) dishonest, i.e. individuals who reported on average a
number larger than the honest benchmark but less than the maximum (6) across the 20
periods; iii) honest, i.e. individuals who reported on average truthfully (3.5) across the
20 periods.
The proportion of Honest Players across conditions is homogeneous. The proportion
of Honest Players A in Loss Frame (8%(0.28)) is the same as the proportion of Honest
Player A in Baseline (4%(0.2), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z = -0.626 p-value = 0.5313 ).
Similarly, the proportion of Honest Players B in Loss Frame (21%(0.41)) is not different
from that in Baseline (9%(0.29), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z = -0.828 p-value = 0.4078).
As for Honest Players, the proportion of Dishonest Players is homogeneous across
conditions. The proportion of Dishonest Players A in Loss Frame (84%(0.38)) is not
different from that in Baseline (64%(0.49), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z = -1.517 p-value =
0.1294). Similarly, the proportion of Dishonest Player B in Loss Frame (75%(0.44)) is not
different from that in Baseline (72%(0.46), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z = -0.235 p-value =
0.8139).
Interestingly, while the proportion of Brazen Player B in Loss Frame (4%(0.20)) does
not differ from that in Baseline (16%(0.37), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z = 1.354 p-value
= 0.1758), we find that the proportion of Brazen Player A in Loss Frame (8%(0.28)) is
significantly higher than that in Baseline (32%(0.48), Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z = 2.034
p-value = 0.0420). This suggests that loss aversion makes it more difficult for Player A to
push Player B towards brazen corruption.
3.5.1.3 Evolution of Collaborative Dishonesty
Figure 3.11 shows the effect of Loss Frame on collaborative dishonesty over the 20 periods
of the game. It shows that in Conflict of Interest collaborative dishonesty is higher than
in Baseline especially in the second half of the game.
We isolate the time effect on collaborative dishonesty by running a random individual
effect probit regression analysis of Player B’s decision to report a double (Table 3.6).
We include a dummy for a block of ten periods (11-20), using the first 10 periods as
baseline. We add the dummy for the treatment Loss Frame (LOSS). Finally, we add the
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Figure 3.10: Decisions by Groups Across Periods: Baseline and Loss Frame
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Figure 3.11: Loss Frame: Doubles over time
interaction between Loss Frame and 11-20 to capture the combined effect. Results show
that collaborative dishonesty in Loss Frame is not likely to change over the last periods
compared to Baseline.
This non-finding suggests that loss aversion does not amplify the negative sides of a
suboptimal environment that forces individuals to corrupt to earn (avoid) some benefits
(losses).
3.5.2 Discussion
Results of Experiment 3 show that loss aversion does not amplify the negative sides of
suboptimal group settings. Differently from previous research on the interaction between
loss aversion and individual dishonest behavior (Kocher et al., 2016; Schindler & Pfatthe-
icher, 2016), our results suggest that loss aversion does not interact with suboptimal
group settings, as the mere exposure to them is sufficient to change perceptions of ethical
values.
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Table 3.6: Random individual effect probit regression analysis of Double decisions: Loss
Frame
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Double Double
LOSS 0.375 0.251
(0.393) (0.404)
11-20 0.149 0.0201
(0.101) (0.140)
11-20 x LOSS 0.266
(0.202)
Constant 0.432 0.495*
(0.283) (0.287)
Observations 980 980
Number of Individuals 49 49
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.6 Personality Traits and Risk Preferences
In all experiments, we asked participants to complete two additional tasks: the ques-
tionnaire based on the Hexaco model of personality traits (Ashton & Lee, 2009) and the
Bomb Risk Elicitation task (BRET) developed by Crosetto & Filippin (2013).
Among the six measures of personality traits, the Honesty-Humility measure is
especially crucial for our study since it represents "the tendency to be fair and genuine in
dealing with others, in the sense of cooperating with others even when one might exploit
them without suffering retaliation" (Ashton & Lee (2007): p. 156). Hilbig et al. (2012) show
that cooperation (i.e. contributions to public goods) depends on high dispositional levels
of Honesty-Humility. However, in our setting cooperation is against ethical norms and
far from being fair. We investigate whether high dispositional levels of Honesty-Humility
decrease the likelihood to act dishonestly.
According to traditional economic approach to dishonesty (Becker, 1968), individual
attitudes toward risk play a crucial role in the assessment of expected costs and, thus,
on the subsequent choice to act dishonestly. On the other hand, extensive experimental
evidence suggests that individual decision to act dishonestly is influenced by a much
broader set of factors than just the costs and benefits associated with the act. In particular,
in a setting characterized by a normative conflict, individual risk preference might not
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Figure 3.12: Average report by A and B by treatment
The dashed line is the expected number reported assuming honesty (3.5)
play the substantial role that is played by other-regarding and moral concerns. We derive
an intuitive measure of risk aversion to investigate whether risk preferences have an
effect on the likelihood to make dishonest decisions in a context that triggers moral and
other-regarding concerns.
These two additional measures allow us to further disentangle across treatments the
determinants behind dishonest reporting by each player (Figure 3.13), and dishonest
cooperation by Player B (Figure 3.12).
First, we run a Random Effect Tobit model 10 (Table 3.7) with reported number by
Player A (Model a) and Player B (Model b) as dependent variable. Among the explanatory
variables we include the dummies variables identifying the experimental conditions: SP
is equal to 1 if the Player is in the Second Party Punishment condition, TP is equal to 1
if the Player is in the Third Party Punishment condition, CI is equal to 1 if the Player is
in the Conflict of Interest condition, LOSS is equal to 1 if the Player is in the Loss Frame
condition. The model is enriched with the personality measure for Honesty-Humility and
risk aversion (Risky choice).
10We run a Tobit model to account for potential censoring in the data from the dependent variable -
bounded between 1 and 6.
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Figure 3.13: Percentage of doubles per treatment
The dashed line is the expected percentage of doubles assuming honesty (16.7%)
As Table 3.7 shows, the dummy associated to Player A’s decision to report a higher
number in Second Party Punishment is negative and significant: the threat of being
sanctioned by Player B for bullying her to act brazenly against honesty decreases the
likelihood to report a higher numbers. This confirms the presence of a normative conflict
characterizing our suboptimal setting. Consistently with the incentive scheme introduced
in Conflict of Interest to report a number around the optimal value of 3.5, the dummy
associated to both Player A’s and Player B’s decision to report higher number in Conflict of
Interest is negative and significant. Finally, individuals with high dispositional Honesty-
Humility are less willing to report high numbers.
Second, we run an Individual Random Effect Probit model (Table 3.8) with the
decision to report a double by Player B as dependent variable. As before, the independent
variables are the dummies identifying the experimental conditions: SP is equal to 1 if
the Player is in the Second Party Punishment condition, TP is equal to 1 if the Player is
in the Third Party Punishment condition, CI is equal to 1 if the Player is in the Conflict
of Interest condition, LOSS is equal to 1 if the Player is in the Loss Frame condition. The
model is enriched with the personality measure for Honesty-Humility and risk aversion
(Risky choice).
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Table 3.7: Individual Random Effect Tobit model: Player A and Player B Report
(a) (a) (b) (b)
VARIABLES ReportA ReportA ReportB ReportB
SP -1.452* -1.568* -0.0975 -0.177
(0.816) (0.809) (0.691) (0.684)
TP -0.451 -0.441 0.514 0.652
(0.800) (0.806) (0.676) (0.673)
CI -4.569*** -4.652*** -2.196*** -2.104***
(0.811) (0.804) (0.686) (0.679)
LOSS -1.178 -1.155 -0.0262 0.0228
(0.806) (0.811) (0.683) (0.684)
Honesty Humility -0.575* -0.576*
(0.366) (0.343)
Risky Choice 0.0112 -0.00687
(0.0146) (0.0128)
Constant 7.477*** 8.938*** 5.789*** 8.041***
(0.580) (1.638) (0.482) (1.416)
Observations 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420
Number of Individuals 121 121 121 121
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As Table 3.8 shows, individuals with high dispositional Honesty-Humility are less
willing to dishonestly collaborate. Moreover, it shows that Second Party Punishment,
Third Party Punishment, Conflict of Interest and Loss Frame have no effect on the
probability to report a double. In order for Second Party Punishment, Third Party
Punishment and Conflict of Interest to have an effect on collaborative dishonesty, we have
to control for the time effect, as we reported in the result sessions of each experiment.
This is consistent with the insight that suboptimal settings shape normative perceptions
of corruption over time.
3.7 General Discussion and Conclusions
In many real-life situations, it is the combined of actions of many individuals belonging
to a group rather than the isolated decision of an individual that produce undesirable
outcomes. Individuals belonging to teams, families, administrative divisions or organiza-
tions may contribute to spread group-specific values and create suboptimal self-enforcing
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Table 3.8: Random Effect Individual Probit model: Double decision
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Double Double
SP 0.311 0.239
(0.358) (0.353)
TP 0.161 0.253
(0.345) (0.341)
CI -0.413 -0.370
(0.352) (0.347)
LOSS 0.375 0.466
(0.354) (0.353)
Honesty Humility -0.365**
(0.178)
Risky Choice 0.00242
(0.00650)
Constant 0.468* 1.576**
(0.249) (0.727)
Observations 2,420 2,420
Number of Individuals 121 121
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
institutions that have a negative influence on the members of a society. In our study,
we use three laboratory experiments to investigate the diffusion of dishonest actions in
group settings when three mechanisms are introduced. Our study focuses on suboptimal
group settings, such as the one depicted by Weisel & Shalvi (2015): individuals are
denied a fair access to opportunities, but are given the incentive to dishonestly collabo-
rate to earn some benefits. We complement the argument by Gächter & Schulz (2016)
that honesty is impaired by the surrounding context. We show that honesty in groups
is negatively affected by the context when this allows for informal norm enforcement
mechanisms, while it is not impaired when the joint stake in the dishonest decision is
added a conflict of interest.
First, our findings add to the literature on suboptimal institutions (Herrmann et al.,
2008; Meier et al., 2016) by showing that group settings that give the incentive to corrupt
distort the typical efficacy of punishment mechanisms to enforce positive norms. Allowing
for norm-enforcement mechanisms, such as second-party and third-party punishment,
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produces anti-social norms, i.e. collaborative dishonesty. Punishment makes individuals
in the group cooperate more, however the type of cooperation involved is against ethical
norms. Dark cooperation outweighs the moral costs associated to dishonesty and changes
negative perceptions of dishonesty.
Second, our study complements evidence on the superior strategic mindset of groups
to that of individuals (Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Sutter, 2009; Feri et al., 2009). Adding
unequal rewards in suboptimal group settings lowers the salience of the joint stake
in dishonest collaboration while increasing that of individual stakes in comparison
with those of others. This way, individuals in the group become more concerned about
inequality than profit-maximization and, as a result, converge slower to dishonest
coordination.
Finally, our results contribute to the literature studying the underlying mechanisms of
dishonest behaviour extended to group settings. Contrary to studies on the relationship
between loss aversion and individual dishonesty (Grolleau et al., 2016; Schindler &
Pfattheicher, 2016), we do not find that loss aversion has an effect on collaborative
dishonesty when the group setting is suboptimally designed.
We also show that differences in ethical behaviour can be explained by personality
traits, such as the Honesty-Humility factor of the model of personality structure (Hilbig
& Zettler, 2015), also in suboptimal group settings.
Our study is of relevance for institutions and organizations that promote aligned
incentives in group settings. These can be threatened by a culture of corruption when
punishment among peers or non-credible monitoring are allowed. On the other hand,
it shows that nesting inequality in the aligned outcomes scheme might represent a
tool to weaken the diffusion of collaborative dishonesty, as team members become less
group-focused and ready to identify corruption as the best strategy for the group.
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This Doctoral Thesis exploits the laboratory experimental approach to disentanglethe influence of suboptimal social contexts on individual decisions. Laboratoryexperimental method provides a clean tool to disentangle the role that several
mechanisms play in complex scenarios, like suboptimal social environments: it allows
to derive causal inference on how social patterns shape individuals’ ultimate decisions.
Laboratory experiments allow to collect rigorous evidence on the underlying mechanisms
that drive behavior in situations that cannot be easily observed in the field. This is of
particular relevance for research aimed at disentangling social determinants of prefer-
ences. It is very difficult to isolate the role that social mental models have on behavior
in the field: throughout their life, individuals are exposed to several environments that
may contribute to develop complex responses to different scenarios.
The three essays of this Doctoral Thesis manipulate social context with the aim to
isolate social determinants on behavior.
The First Chapter focused on experiences of unfairness in a social context in which
group identity is salient, inspired by the evidence that episodes of unfairness promote
unethical decisions. We manipulated group identity to induce a mental model such that
individuals perceive individuals sharing the same group identity differently from those
with a conflicting group identity. This treatment was necessary to investigate whether
individuals tolerate unfairness by an ingroup differently from that made by an outgroup.
The results support the predictions that when social context makes a particular group
identity salient, individuals change their perceptions of unfairness and, in turn, react
accordingly in the form of unethical behavior. The design focused on the peril of allowing
for the coexistence of different cultures across organizational divisions and subunits. The
findings are of practical relevance for organizations which have to deliver a wage that
does not reflect the employee’s effort. By failing to build a shared corporate culture, they
might foster employees’ fairness-restorative dishonest behavior which is costly to society.
The Second Chapter investigated the role of a cultural mental model, like that of
gender stereotype, in decisions that require predicting others’ risk attitudes. We first
assessed whether the belief that women are more risk averse than men is accurate by
structurally estimating risk preferences under two alternative models of choice. Second,
we assessed the extent according to which individuals exploit gender information to
predict others’ risk attitude. Our findings suggest that predictions of others’ risk attitude
are biased by gender stereotype: they emphasize the need to avoid providing gender
information to individuals that make decisions in which one’s risk attitude has to be
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taken into account.
The Third Chapter focused on a social context that induces individuals to gain
benefits other than through collaborative dishonesty. This context was the setting of
Weisel & Shalvi (2015) and mimics real world situations, such as organizations that
equally reward employees working in teams only if the team performs well. This essay
analyzed the impact that punishment, conflict of interest and loss aversion have on
perceptions of corruption. Our results suggest that introducing a norm enforcement
mechanism, such as second party and third party punishment, augments the negative
externalities associated to suboptimal social contexts: this enforces the diffusion of
collaborative dishonesty. Organizations that allow for peer punishment and non-credible
monitoring are at risk of facing a dramatic diffusion of cases of collaborative dishonesty.
Second, it shows that introducing a conflict of interest in the aligned incentive scheme
lowers the diffusion of corruption. Organizations that introduces inequality in the team
reward scheme are less likely to face the diffusion of collaborative dishonesty. Finally,
our results suggest that loss aversion does not promote collaborative dishonesty, as the
mere exposure to suboptimal group settings is sufficient to change perceptions of ethical
values.
Limitations and further research
One of the most popular critique to laboratory experimental findings is the extent to
which they can be generalized to the real world, as they lack external validity (Levitt &
List, 2007). However, the aim of laboratory experiments is not to provide generalizability,
but a benchmark to policy makers and organizations before they implement costly
interventions. Laboratory experiments allow to isolate the effect of a desired contextual
change on behavior in a fully controlled environment. Moreover, they allow to derive
rigorous evidence on behaviors that correlate well with behaviors outside the lab (Gächter
& Schulz, 2016).
However, as for any laboratory evidence, the findings of this research would highly
benefit from complementing evidence from field experiments. The first Chapter suffers
from manipulating group identity in the laboratory. Building a real group identity in
the field would probably create a real change in the self-concept that, in turn, cues the
mental model of differently interpreting interactions with individuals belonging to the
same or to a different group.
The Second Chapter restricts the investigation of predictions of others’ risk attitude
to female and male targets to address gender stereotype bias. However, false consensus
bias is also crucial in predictions of others’ behavior. A follow-up aimed at better isolating
false consensus bias from gender stereotype might include a treatment in which no
information about the target is provided.
Results from Experiment 3 in the Third Chapter might be corroborated by running
a control condition aimed at comparing behavior in individual settings and in group
settings. This would allow to better grasp framing effect on dishonest behavior.
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A.1 Dictator’s Dishonest Behavior
As for Recipients, to address the causal relationship between unfairness and dictators’
dishonest behavior given different types of salient group identity we run a regression
model (Table A.1). The dependent variable Reported.value is given by the integer
reported in the dishonesty task. Among explanatory variables, we have dummy variables
controlling for group identity conditions: IN is equal to one when the dictator belongs to
the same group and zero otherwise; OUT is equal to one when the dictator belongs to
the other group and zero otherwise. BASE is the baseline condition.
We enrich the model with fairness-related variables: the proportionality index φ
(prop.index, see Table 1.1) of dictator’s choices and the extent according to which pro-
portionality is perceived as appropriate in the Social Norm task (prop.norm, see Table
1.2). The interactions between the fairness-related variables and the group experimental
conditions are also added. Finally, we consider a few control variables: report.time (the
time in seconds required to report the value); age; f emale, and civic.score (a categori-
cal variable of individuals’ participation to collective activities, such as political parties
and NGOs).
As Table A.1 shows, we find that group identity does not affect dictators’ decision
to report dishonestly. In fact, the treatment dummies are not statistically significant.
Similarly, we find that higher violations of proportionality predicts higher willingness to
report dishonestly, but unconditionally on the group identity conditions.
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Table A.1: Dictators’ self-reported values (Ordered Probit regression)
(1) (2) (3)
rep.value rep.value rep.value
prop.index 0.665∗∗(0.299) 0.814(0.573) 1.039(0.582)∗
prop.norm -0.218(0.253) -0.505(0.427) -0.580(0.437)
IN -0.0829(0.782) -0.293(0.800)
OUT -0.147(0.628) -0.0833(0.642)
prop.index× IN 0.150(0.803) 0.166(0.818)
prop.index×OUT -0.428(0.742) -0.835(0.777)
prop.norm× IN 0.290(0.692) 0.288(0.711)
prop.norm×OUT 0.433(0.592) 0.226(0.608)
report.time 0.00956(0.00557)∗
f emale -0.430(0.239)∗
age -0.0952(0.0485)∗∗
civic.score -0.180(0.102)
Observations 95 95 95
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
An Ordered Probit regression model is adopted to account for the different attitude individuals
display when they report increasingly high values.
In fact, mirroring Konow (2000), we found that, unconditionally on the experimental
conditions, on average, dictators allocate to themselves more than what they earned
because they have a personal stake in the allocation choice outcome (Table 1.1). The
evidence that higher violations of proprionality principle lead to higher reported values
suggests that dictators infer their own type and values from their past choices (Bénabou
& Tirole, 2011): the more they have been selfish in the allocation task, the more they are
selfish in the dishonesty task. This insight is supported by the evidence that dictators
taking more time to report the value, are more likely to report higher values: to infer
who they are, dictators require more time.
Finally, we find that dictators’ dishonest behaviour correlates with observable charac-
teristics. Women are less likely to engage in dishonest behaviour than men (Dreber &
Johannesson, 2008; Houser et al., 2012; Bucciol et al., 2013). The likelihood to engage
in dishonest behaviour decreases with age since adults find it easier to self-restrain
(Glätzle-Rützler & Lergetporer, 2015).
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A.2 Robustness Check
Table A.2: Recipients’ self-reported values (Tobit regression)
(1) (2) (3)
rep.value rep.value rep.value
prop.index 0.048(0.998) -1.92(2.066) -2.232(2.05)
prop.norm -0.661(0.981) -2.394(1.88) -2.562(1.87)
IN -1.27(2.473) -1.663(2.461)
OUT -3.023(2.581) -2.775(2.553)
prop.index× IN 1.329(2.466) 1.872(2.481)
prop.index×OUT 5.686(2.884)∗ 6.095(2.913)∗∗
prop.norm× IN 1.512(2.411) 1.607(2.422)
prop.norm×OUT 3.212(2.489) 2.622(2.499)
report.time 0.0141(0.0249)
f emale -1.12(0.941)
age -0.0487(0.172)
civic.score 0.0498(0.421)
Constant 8.204(0.967)∗∗∗ 9.669(2.072)∗∗∗ 10.96(4.519)∗∗
sigma
Constant 4.051(0.434)∗∗∗ 3.862(0.412)∗∗∗ 3.812(0.406)∗∗∗
Observations 93 93 93
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
A Tobit regression model is adopted to account for bounded support of choices (ul=9, ll=0).
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance symbols: ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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A.3 Screenshots from the experiment
Figure A.1: Real Effort Task
Figure A.2: Group Identity: Guess Task.
84
A.3. SCREENSHOTS FROM THE EXPERIMENT
Figure A.3: Group Identity: Group Assignment.
Figure A.4: Group Identity: Proverb task.
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Figure A.5: Dictator Game.
Figure A.6: Dishonesty task.
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A.4 Instructions (translated)
You are now taking part in an economic experiment which has been financed by various
foundations for research purposes. Please read carefully the instructions that we have
distributed to you. During the experiment you will have the opportunity to earn a sum of
money that will depend on your actions, your decisions, the other participants’ decisions
and some random factors. You will receive this sum of money at the end of the experiment.
You will earn anyway AC3 for showing up to the experiment.
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment.
If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all
payments. Should you have any questions please raise your hand: a lab assistant will
come to your place.
During the experiment your earning will be calculated in tokens. At the end of the
experiment the total amount of tokens you have earned will be converted into real money
at the following rate:
1 token = 1 AC
You are free to leave the experiment if you want to, however you will not receive any
sum of money.
During the experiment you will have the opportunity of making choices that will
influence both your earning and that of other participants. The choices made by each
subject will be totally anonymous.
Anonymity will be maintained both during and after the experiment: all the money you
will earn will be privately paid in another room when the experiment will be over.
General overview
Please read carefully the description of the situation you are about to face. You and other
fifteen people are participating in the experimental session. The experiment is made of
four stages. All tasks will be computerized. After completing each stage, the next stage
instructions will appear on the screen of your computer. As is the case in all economics
experiments, we will always provide you true information that never deceives you in any
way.
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Slider Task
In the first stage you will have the opportunity to earn a portion of your final earning.
After reading the instructions, a white page with six sliders will appear on the screen of
your computer. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be moved as far as 100. You
can use your mouse or touchscreen to move each slider. Your goal is to position the slider
at the value shown on its right. Once you have positioned the slider at the goal value,
the value shown on its right will turn from red to green. The current slider position is on
the left of the slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you
want. After adjusting the six sliders in each page, a new page with six sliders will appear
on the screen of your computer. The total number of pages you will complete within 300
seconds will be the first part of your earning. The second stage instructions will appear
on the screen of your computer once the 300 seconds will be over.
Guessing task
After completing the first stage, you will be asked to answer a simple question that
will appear on the screen of your computer. You can use your mouse or touchscreen
to answer to this question. You will be asked to choose a random number between 1
and 99. To communicate the number you choose you will have to position two sliders:
the position of the first slider will be the tens of your number, while the position of
the second slider will be the units of your number. Depending on your answers, you
will be assigned to the Red group or the Yellow group. The division in groups will take
place according to a similarity/distance criterion with a number randomly chosen by the
computer. Participants who will choose the closest numbers to the one randomly chosen
by the computer will be assigned to one colour, while participants who will choose the
farther numbers to the one randomly chosen by the computer will be assigned to the
other colour. The colors will be randomly assigned by the computer to the criterion of
similarity and distance.
After communicating the number you have chosen, you will be shown if you have been
assigned to the Red or Yellow group on the screen of your computer.
Proverb task
At this stage you will be asked to complete a task together with participants assigned to
the same group colour as yours. Particularly, you and the other mates will be shown a
series of words and letters. You and your mates will be asked to organize the words and
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letters to form a proverb. There is no time constraint. However, only the fastest group at
completing the proverb will enable all group members to earn an additional amount of
money at the end of the experiment.
Feedback
After completing the proverb bask together with your mates, you will be shown on the
screen of your computer the total number of pages you have completed in the slider task.
Before starting the next stage, the computer will match you with another participant.
You will be informed about the group affiliation and your role. Your partner and your
role will be randomly chosen by the computer.
Allocation task
In this stage of the experiment you will be asked to complete a task with the partner you
have been previously informed of.
First, you and your partner will be shown the sum of the partner’s and your earnings
from the slider task. Depending on the role you have been randomly assigned, you will
be shown the details on your computer screen. If you have been assigned to the role of
dictator, you will be asked to decide how to divide the sum of the earnings between you
and your partner. Your partner will be shown the amount you will offer at the end of
the task. If you have been assigned to the role of recipient, you will have to wait your
partner’s offer.
Questionnaire
After completing the allocation task, you will be asked to answer to a short questionnaire.
You will have the opportunity of earning an additional amount of money for your time.
After answering all questions, you will receive a final feedback about the additional
earnings from completing all tasks. At this stage, you will have to wait for a lab assistant
who will call your seat number for being paid in the other room.
We would also be grateful if you did not discuss the experiment with the other partici-
pants outside the laboratory.
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A.5 On-screen Questionnaire
Allocation task
Recipient Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements (1-not at all
7-very much):
• The amount offered by the dictator is fair 
• The amount offered by the dictator is fair given the dictator’s and my results from
the slider task 
• The amount offered by the dictator is fair given the effort the dictator and I have
exerted in the slider task 
• If I had been assigned to the role of dictator, I would have offered the same amount
the dictator has offered to me 
• If you do not agree with the previous statements, please indicate the amount you
would have offered if you had been assigned to the role of dictator 
Dictator Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements (1-not at
all 7-very much):
• The amount I offered is fair 
• The amount I offered is fair given my and the recipient’s results from the slider
task 
• The amount I offered is fair given the effort the recipient and I have exerted in the
slider task 
• I would have offered a different amount if the initial sum to divide had been
different 
• The offer I made to the recipient was based on the information about the effort
that the recipient and I have exerted in the slider task 
• The offer I made to the recipient was based on the information about the recipient’s
group affiliation 
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All
Individual A finds AC10 in the street. He decides to share it with a pedes-
trian. The table below presents a list of the possible choices available to In-
dividual A. How much socially appropriate do you believe is each option?
Individual A Very socially in-
appropriate
Socially
inappro-
priate
Socially appropriate Very socially ap-
propriate
Offers 0, keeps 10
Offers 2, keeps 8
Offers 4, keeps 6
Offers 5, keeps 5
Offers 6, keeps 4
Offers 8, keeps 2
Offers 10, keeps 0
All
Individual A finds AC10 in the street. He meets a friend and decides to share
it. The table below presents a list of the possible choices available to In-
dividual A. How much socially appropriate do you believe is each option?
Individual A Very socially in-
appropriate
Socially
inappro-
priate
Socially appropriate Very socially ap-
propriate
Offers 0, keeps 10
Offers 2, keeps 8
Offers 4, keeps 6
Offers 5, keeps 5
Offers 6, keeps 4
Offers 8, keeps 2
Offers 10, keeps 0
Group
1. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements (1-not at all
7-very much):
• I feel similar to the member of my color group 
• I identify myself with the members of my color group 
• I might behave differently with the members of the other color group 
2. Slide the circle "I" towards the circle "Other" to describe how connected you feel to
the group you have been assigned.
How do you feel
Recipient Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements (1-not at all
7-very much):
• I feel I have been treated fairly by the dictator 
• I feel I have been treated fairly by the dictator given my result from the slider task

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• I feel I have been treated fairly by the dictator given the effort I exerted in the
slider task 
• I was disappointed by the dictator’s behavior given that the dictator is a member
of my group color 
• I was angry because of the dictator’s behavior given that the dictator is a member
of my group color
Dictator Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements (1-not at all
7-very much):
• I feel I have treated fairly the recipient 
• I feel I was selfish at offering to the recipient the amount I chose 
• I felt unpleasant at offering to the recipient the amount I chose 
• I felt unpleasant at offering the amount I chose given that the recipient is a member
of my group 
About you
• Department 
• Gender 
• Age 
• Only child 
• How big is the place you spent most of your life?  (1:up to 2000 inhabitants
abitanti; 2:2000-10000; 3:10000-100000; 4: more than 100000)
• How often do you attend religious events?  (0:Never; 1: sometimes; 2:more than
once in a week)
• Do you participate in one of the following organizations as member? (0:Never; 1:
sometimes; 2:more than once in a week)
– Sport club 
– Choir, orchestra 
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– Political party 
– NGOs 
– Other organizations 
As you spent some time answering this questionnaire, you have now the op-
portunity to earn an additional sum of money. Wait for the instructions on the
screen of your computer.
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B.1 Robustness Check
Table B.1: Prediction Bias: Tobit Model
(Femalea) (Femaleb) (Malea) (Maleb)
VARIABLES PC-AC PC-AC PC-AC PC-AC
FemaleTarget 0.00338 0.00318 -0.0843* -0.0777*
(0.0408) (0.0364) (0.0477) (0.0434)
PredictorChoice 0.263*** 0.289***
(0.0364) (0.0509)
Constant 0.0174 -0.0864** 0.03046** -0.0541
(0.0248) (0.0790) (0.00456) (0.0340)
Observations 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,880
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B.2 Prospect Parameters
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Table B.2: Left Prospect Parameters
(S-C) Lp1 Lp2 Lp3 La1 La2 La3 EV(L)
1 0.5 0.5 0 0 2 0 1
2 1 0 0 2 0 0 2
3 1 0 0 2 0 0 2
4 0.25 0.75 0 0 2 0 1.5
5 0.25 0.75 0 0 2 0 1.5
6 1 0 0 2 0 0 2
7 1 0 0 4 0 0 4
8 0.75 0.25 0 4 7 0 4.75
9 0.5 0.5 0 4 14 0 9
10 0.5 0.5 0 0 14 0 7
11 1 0 0 4 0 0 4
12 0.75 0.25 0 4 14 0 6.5
13 1 0 0 7 0 0 7
14 0.75 0.25 0 7 14 0 8.75
15 0.75 0.25 0 7 14 0 8.75
(S-AE) Lp1 Lp2 Lp3 La1 La2 La3 EV(L)
1 0.5 0.5 0 0 2 0 1
2 1 0 0 2 0 0 2
3 1 0 0 2 0 0 2
4 0.75 0.25 0 2 0 0 1.5
5 0.75 0.25 0 2 0 0 1.5
6 1 0 0 2 0 0 2
7 1 0 0 4 0 0 4
8 0.25 0.75 0 7 4 0 4.75
9 0.5 0.5 0 4 14 0 9
10 0.5 0.5 0 0 14 0 7
11 1 0 0 4 0 0 4
12 0.25 0.75 0 14 4 0 6.5
13 1 0 0 7 0 0 7
14 0.25 0.75 0 14 7 0 8.75
15 0.25 0.75 0 14 7 0 8.75
(AE-C) Lp1 Lp2 Lp3 La1 La2 La3 EV(L)
1 0.25 0.75 0 4 0 0 1
2 0.25 0.25 0.5 2 7 0 2.25
3 0.75 0.25 0 0 7 0 1.75
4 0.5 0.5 0 0 14 0 7
5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 4 7 4.5
6 0.25 0.75 0 0 7 0 5.25
7 0.25 0.75 0 0 14 0 10.5
8 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 14 4 5.5
0 0.25 0.75 0 0 14 0 10.5
10 0.5 0.5 0 0 14 0 7
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Table B.3: Right Prospect Parameters
(S-C) Rp1 Rp2 Rp3 Ra1 Ra2 Ra3 Compound EV( R)
1 0.5 0.5 0 0 2 0 if Ra2 (-2 or 2) 1
2 0.5 0.5 0 0 2 0 if Ra2 (-2 or 2) 1
3 0.5 0.5 0 1 3.5 0 if Ra1 (1 or -1) 2.25
4 0.5 0.5 0 0 3.5 0 if Ra2 (3.5 or -3.5) 1.75
5 1 0 0 7 0 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 7
6 1 0 0 7 0 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 7
7 0.5 0.5 0 2 7 0 if Ra1 (2 or -2) 4.5
8 0.5 0.5 0 3.5 7 0 if Ra1 (3.5 or -3.5) 5.25
9 0.5 0.5 0 7 14 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 10.5
10 0.5 0.5 0 7 4 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 5.5
11 0.5 0.5 0 7 4 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 5.5
12 0.5 0.5 0 7 14 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 10.5
13 0.5 0.5 0 7 14 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 10.5
14 1 0 0 7 0 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 7
15 0.5 0.5 0 7 14 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 10.5
(S-AE) Rp1 Rp2 Rp3 Ra1 Ra2 Ra3 Compound EV( R)
1 0.25 0.75 0 4 0 0 - 1
2 0.25 0.75 0 4 0 0 - 1
3 0.25 0.25 0.5 2 7 0 - 2.25
4 0.25 0.75 0 7 0 0 - 1.75
5 0.5 0.5 0 0 14 0 - 7
6 0.5 0.5 0 0 14 0 - 7
7 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 4 7 - 4.5
8 0.25 0.75 0 0 7 0 - 5.25
9 0.25 0.75 0 0 14 0 - 10.5
10 0.25 0.25 0.5 14 4 0 - 5.5
11 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 14 4 - 5.5
12 0.25 0.75 0 0 14 0 - 10.5
13 0.25 0.75 0 0 14 0 - 10.5
14 0.5 0.5 0 0 14 0 - 7
15 0.25 0.75 0 0 14 0 - 10.5
(AE-C) Rp1 Rp2 Rp3 Ra1 Ra2 Ra3 Compound EV( R)
1 0.5 0.5 0 0 2 0 if Ra2 (2 or -2) 1
2 0.5 0.5 0 1 3.5 0 if Ra2 (3.5 or -3.5) 2.25
3 0.5 0.5 0 0 3.5 0 if Ra1 (3.5 or -3.5) 1.75
4 1 0 0 7 0 0 if Ra2 (3.5 or -3.5) 7
5 0.5 0.5 0 2 7 0 if Ra1 (2 or -2) 4.5
6 0.5 0.5 0 7 3.5 0 if Ra2 (3.5 or -3.5) 5.25
7 0.5 0.5 0 7 14 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 10.5
8 0.5 0.5 0 7 4 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 5.5
0 0.5 0.5 0 7 14 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 10.5
10 1 0 0 7 0 0 if Ra1 (7 or -7) 7
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B.3 Instructions
Choices over Prospects
This is a task where you will choose between prospects with varying prizes and chances
of winning. You will be presented with 40 pairs of prospects. For each pair of prospects,
you should choose the prospect you prefer to play. You will actually get the chance to play
one of the prospects you choose, and you will be paid according to the outcome of that
prospect, so you should think carefully about which prospect you prefer.
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Image B.1 is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of prospects
might look like.
Figure B.1: Example of on-screen prospects
The outcome of the prospects will be determined by the draw of a random number
between 1 and 100. Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally likely to
occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided dice.
In the above example the left prospect pays one pound (£1) if the number drawn is
between 1 and 40, and it pays three pounds (£3) if the number is between 41 and 100.
The blue color in the pie chart corresponds to 40% of the area and illustrates the chances
that the number drawn will be between 1 and 40 and your prize will be £1. The green
area in the pie chart corresponds to 60% of the area and illustrates the chances that the
number drawn will be between 41 and 100 and your prize will be £3.
Now look at the pie in the chart on the right. It pays 1 pound (£1) if the number
drawn is between 1 and 50; it pays two pounds (£2) if the number is between 51 and 90;
and it pays three pounds (£3) if the number is between 91 and 100. As with the prospect
on the left, the pie slices represent the fraction of the possible numbers which yield each
payoff. For example, the size of the £3 pie slice is 10% of the total pie.
Each pair of prospects is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen,
you should indicate which prospect you prefer to play by clicking on one of the buttons
beneath the prospects.
You could also get a pair of prospects in which one of the prospects will give you a
new lottery option. For instance, the right prospect in the following screen image (Image
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B.2) pays a new lottery if the Blue area is selected, which happens if the number drawn
is between 51 and 100. The right pie chart indicates that if the number is between 1 and
50 you get £2. If the number is between 51 and 100 you get £4 and a new lottery which
gives you £−4 if Heads comes up and £4if Tails comes up. The prizes listed underneath
each pie refer to the amounts before any coin toss.
Figure B.2: Example of on-screen prospects
After you have worked through all of the 40 pairs of prospects, raise your hand and
an experimenter will come over. You will then roll two 10-sided dice until a number
between 1 and 40 comes up to determine which pair of prospects will be played out. Since
there is a chance that any of your 40 choices could be played out for real, you should
approach each pair of prospects as if it is the one that you will play out. Finally, you will
roll the two ten-sided dice to determine the outcome of the prospect you chose, and if
necessary you will then toss a coin to determine the outcome of the new lottery option.
For instance, suppose you picked the prospect on the left in the last example. If the
random number was 37, you would win £0; if it was 93, you would get £4.
If you picked the prospect on the right and drew the number 37, you would get £2;
if it was 93, you would have to toss a coin to determine the outcome of the new lottery
option. If the coin comes up Heads then you get £4, and if it comes up Tails you get £−4.
It is also possible that you will be given a prospect in which there is a new lottery
option no matter what the outcome of the random number. The screen B.3 illustrates
this possibility.
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Figure B.3: Example of on-screen prospects
Therefore, your payoff is determined by four things:
• by which prospect you selected, the left or the right, for each of these 40 pairs;
• by which prospect pair is chosen to be played out in the series of 40 such pairs
using the two 10-sided dice;
• by the outcome of that prospect when you roll the two 10-sided dice;
• by the outcome of a coin toss if the chosen prospect outcome is of the new option
type.
Which prospects you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you
may be presented with different prospects, and may have different preferences,
so their responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your
choices by thinking carefully about each prospect. All payoffs are in cash, and are
in addition to the £5 show-up fee that you receive just for being here.
Beliefs about Choices over Prospects
A group of 10 students at Durham University have previously participated in this
experiment. Of these 10 participants, 5 are men and 5 are women.
This is a task where you will indicate your beliefs about the choices made by 1 of these
10 previous participants. First, you will randomly select 1 of the 10 previous participants.
The previous participants chose between prospects with varying prizes and chances of
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winning. You will be presented with 40 pairs of prospects. For each pair of prospects, you
should choose the prospect that you think was chosen by the randomly selected previous
participant. You will actually be paid based on the accuracy of your belief about the
randomly selected previous participant’s choice for one of the pairs of prospects, so you
should think carefully about which prospect you think was chosen.
The exact instructions that were given to the 10 previous participants have been
provided to you. Please read them carefully before making your predictions.
Your payoff will be determined by the following four things:
• by which prospect you believe was chosen, the left or the right, for each of the 40
pairs;
• by which prospect pair is selected to be used for payment in the series of 40 such
pairs using the two 10-sided dice;
• by which of the 10 previous participants is randomly selected;
• by which prospect the previous participant chose in the prospect pair that is
selected for payment.
You will be paid £5 if your belief is correct in the randomly selected prospect pair. If your
belief is incorrect you will be paid £0.
When you randomly select 1 of the 10 previous participants, you will be given an
envelope that contains a list of the 40 choices by the person. On the outside of the
envelope, you will see an ID number for the previous participant, labelled 1 to 10. Odd
numbers indicate that the person is a male, and even numbers indicate that the person
is a female. Inside the envelope is a printed table of the choices between prospects made
by the randomly selected previous participant. Once you have indicated your beliefs
for all 40 pairs, an experimenter will open the envelope so that the randomly selected
previous participant’s choices can be verified.
Which prospects your think were chosen by the randomly selected previous partic-
ipant is a matter of your personal beliefs. The people next to you may be presented
with different prospects and decisions by different previous participants, so their beliefs
should not matter to you. Please work silently and think carefully about each prospect
before indicating your belief. All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the £5show-up
fee that you receive just for being here.
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Demographic Survey
In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive. We will not be grading your
answers and your responses are completely confidential. Please think carefully about
each question and give your best answers.
1. What is your age?
2. What is your sex?
• Male
• Female
3. Which of the following categories best describes you?
• White
• Mixed
• Asian or Asian British
• Chinese or other ethnic group
• Prefer not to say
4. What is your main field of study?
• Accounting
• Economics
• Finance
• Business Administration, other than Accounting, Economics, or Finance
• Education
• Engineering
• Health and Medicine
• Biological and Biomedical Sciences
• Math, Computer Sciences, or Physical Sciences
• Social Sciences or History
• Law
104
B.3. INSTRUCTIONS
• Psychology
• Modern Languages and Cultures
• Other Fields
5. What is your year of studies?
• First year
• Second year
• Third year
• Masters
• Doctoral
6. What is the highest level of education you expect to complete?
• Bachelor’s degree
• Master’s degree
• Doctoral degree
• Professional qualification
7. As a percentage, what is your current average mark if you are doing a Bachelor’s
degree, or what was it when you did a Bachelor’s degree? This mark should refer to
all your years of study for this degree, not just the current year. Please pick one by
rounding up or down to the nearest number:
• Above 70%
• Between 60 and 69%
• Between 50 and 59%
• Between 40 and 49%
• Less than 40%
• Have not taken courses for which grades are given.
8. What is your citizenship status?
• British Citizen
• EU Citizen (non-British Citizen)
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• Non-EU Citizen
9. Are you currently:
• Single and never married?
• Married?
• Separated, divorced or widowed?
10. How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your spouse and any
dependents. Do not include your parents or roommates unless you claim them as
dependents.
11. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of income before
tax earned in the calendar year 2014 by the people in your household (as ‚Äúhouse-
hold‚Äù is defined in question 10). [Consider all forms of income, including salaries,
tips, interest and dividend payments, scholarship support, student loans, parental
support, social security, alimony, and child support, and others.]
• Less than £10,000
• £10,000 and £19,999
• £20,000 and £29,999
• £30,000 and £49,999
• Over £50,000
12. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of income before
tax earned in the calendar year 2014 by your parents. [Consider all forms of income,
including salaries, tips, interest and dividend payments, social security, alimony,
and child support, and others.]
• Less than £10,000
• £10,000 and £19,999
• £20,000 and £29,999
• £30,000 and £49,999
• Over £50,000
• Don’t Know
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13. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (Circle one number.)
• No
• Yes
• If yes, approximately how much do you smoke in one day? ... cigarettes.
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C.1 Instructions
Participants were given written and on-screen instructions. Before starting the task,
they were instructed to try to roll the die a couple of times. Differently from Weisel and
Shalvi (2015), the written instructions were not only general, but they also included the
treatment-specific instructions presented on the screen.
Printed Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment! You have received DKK 50
for having shown up on time. This amount will not be affected by the experiment results.
Please, read carefully the printed and the on-screen instructions. The instructions are the
same for all participants. Before starting each phase, there will be some control questions
to verify that you understood the instructions. Should you have any questions about
the instructions, raise your hand and a lab assistant will come to your place. During
the experiment, your earnings are calculated in points. At the end of the experiment,
the total amount of points you have earned will be converted into DKK at the following
exchange rate:
1point= 1DKK
The decisions made by you and by the other participants are anonymous. Anonymity
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is maintained throughout and after the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you
will be privately paid in another room. The experiment will consist of two parts and two
questionnaires.
First phase In the first phase, you will be asked to roll the die in the cup and to report
the outcome on the computer. To roll, hold the cup in your hand, shake a few times,
and place the cup on your desk. You will look at the result and you will report it on the
computer. After reporting, you will place the die inside the cup to avoid losing it. Roll the
die a few times now to be sure you have understood the procedure.
On-screen instructions
In this phase, your task will be to roll the 6-sided die and report the outcome.
This task will be repeated for 20 periods. At end of the 20 periods, 1 period will be
randomly selected and you will be paid according to that period earning. At the beginning
of each period, you have an endowment of 46 points. You can earn additional points
depending on the result of two die rolls. Before starting the phase, you will be randomly
matched with 1 anonymous player. This matching will be the same for all the 20 periods.
You and the other player will be randomly assigned to two roles that define the sequence
of rolling: Player A rolls first and reports, then Player B rolls and reports. The roles
will be the same for all the 20 periods. The other player can see the outcome you have
reported, and you can see the other player’s report. For instance, if you are Player B you
can see what Player A has reported, and Player A can see what you have reported. The
earning from this phase depends on the result of yours and the other participant’s die
rolls. If you and the other player get different outcomes, you and the other player will
earn 0 points. If you and the other player get the same outcome, you and the other player
will earn a sum of points according to the following table.
Table C.1: Earnings
Player A’s outcome Player B’s outcome Outcome Earning
1 1 1+1 ·10= 20
2 2 2+2 ·10= 40
3 3 3+3 ·10= 60
4 4 4+4 ·10= 80
5 5 5+5 ·10= 100
6 6 6+6 ·10= 120
In each period, you can use 6 points of your endowment of 46 points to take actions
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against the other player. Each action that you take reduces your endowment by 1 point.
For instance, if you are Player A and you take an action of 3 points against Player B,
your endowment in that period is 43(46−3) . Each action that you take reduces the other
player’s endowment by 2 points. For instance, if you take an action of 3 points against
Player B, you have reduced Player B’s endowment by 6 points in that period. The other
player can also take actions against you. Each action taken by the other player against
you reduces your endowment by 2 points. For instance, if you are Player A and Player B
has taken an action of 4 points your endowment in that period is reduced by 8 points.
Figure C.1: Example on-screen Instructions
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Figure C.2: Control questions
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C.1.1 Decision screens
Figure C.3: Player A enters the report at Period 4
Figure C.4: After Player B has made the decision, Player A has the option to punish
Player B
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Figure C.5: After Player B has decided to punish Player A, Player A is shown the final
earning from Period 4
114
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abeler, Johannes, Becker, Anke, & Falk, Armin. 2014.
Representative evidence on lying costs.
Journal of Public Economics, 113, 96–104.
Abeler, Johannes, Nosenzo, Daniele, & Raymond, Collin. 2016.
Preferences for truth-telling.
Adams, J Stacy. 1965.
Inequity in social exchange.
Advances in experimental social psychology, 2(267-299).
Akerlof, George A, & Kranton, Rachel E. 2000.
Economics and identity.
Quarterly journal of Economics, 715–753.
Akerlof, George A, & Kranton, Rachel E. 2005.
Identity and the Economics of Organizations.
Journal of Economic perspectives, 9–32.
Akerlof, George A, & Kranton, Rachel E. 2008.
Identity, supervision, and work groups.
The American Economic Review, 212–217.
Alempaki, Despoina, Dog˘an, Gönül, & Saccardo, Silvia. 2016.
Deception and Reciprocity.
Ambrose, Maureen L, Seabright, Mark A, & Schminke, Marshall. 2002.
Sabotage in the workplace: The role of organizational injustice.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89(1), 947–965.
Ames, Daniel R. 2004.
115
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Strategies for social inference: a similarity contingency model of projection and stereo-
typing in attribute prevalence estimates.
Journal of personality and social psychology, 87(5), 573.
Andersen, Steffen, Harrison, Glenn W, Lau, Morten Igel, & Rutström, E Elisabet. 2006.
Elicitation using multiple price list formats.
Experimental Economics, 9(4), 383–405.
Ashton, Michael C, & Lee, Kibeom. 2007.
Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO model of personality
structure.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11(2), 150–166.
Ashton, Michael C, & Lee, Kibeom. 2009.
The HEXACO–60: A short measure of the major dimensions of personality.
Journal of personality assessment, 91(4), 340–345.
Ball, Sheryl, Eckel, Catherine C, & Heracleous, Maria. 2010.
Risk aversion and physical prowess: Prediction, choice and bias.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 41(3), 167–193.
Balliet, Daniel, Wu, Junhui, & De Dreu, Carsten KW. 2014.
Ingroup favoritism in cooperation: A meta-analysis.
American Psychological Association.
Barr, Abigail, Miller, Luis, & Ubeda, Paloma. 2016.
Moral consequences of becoming unemployed.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(17), 4676–4681.
Baumgartner, Thomas, Schiller, Bastian, Rieskamp, Jörg, Gianotti, Lorena RR, & Knoch,
Daria. 2013.
Diminishing parochialism in intergroup conflict by disrupting the right temporo-
parietal junction.
Social cognitive and affective neuroscience, nst023.
Becker, Gary S. 1968.
Crime and punishment: An economic approach.
Journal of Political economy, 76(2), 169–217.
116
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Becker, Gordon M, DeGroot, Morris H, & Marschak, Jacob. 1964.
Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method.
Behavioral science, 9(3), 226–232.
Bénabou, Roland, & Tirole, Jean. 2011.
Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2), 805–855.
Binswanger, Hans P. 1980.
Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural India.
American journal of agricultural economics, 62(3), 395–407.
Binswanger, Hans P. 1981.
Attitudes toward risk: Theoretical implications of an experiment in rural India.
The Economic Journal, 91(364), 867–890.
Bolton, Gary E, & Ockenfels, Axel. 2000.
ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition.
American economic review, 166–193.
Bowles, Samuel. 1998.
Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other economic
institutions.
Journal of economic literature, 36(1), 75–111.
Bucciol, Alessandro, & Piovesan, Marco. 2011.
Luck or cheating? A field experiment on honesty with children.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(1), 73–78.
Bucciol, Alessandro, Landini, Fabio, & Piovesan, Marco. 2013.
Unethical behavior in the field: Demographic characteristics and beliefs of the cheater.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 248–257.
Cadsby, C Bram, Song, Fei, & Tapon, Francis. 2010.
Are you paying your employees to cheat? An experimental investigation.
The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10(1).
Cappelen, Alexander W, Eichele, Tom, Hugdahl, Kenneth, Specht, Karsten, Sørensen,
Erik Ø, & Tungodden, Bertil. 2014.
Equity theory and fair inequality: A neuroeconomic study.
117
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(43), 15368–15372.
Chakravarty, Sujoy, Harrison, Glenn W, Haruvy, Ernan E, & Rutström, E Elisabet. 2011.
Are you risk averse over other people’s money?
Southern Economic Journal, 77(4), 901–913.
Charness, Gary, & Dufwenberg, Martin. 2006.
Promises and partnership.
Econometrica, 74(6), 1579–1601.
Charness, Gary, & Jackson, Matthew O. 2007.
Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation.
Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 417–445.
Chen, Roy, & Chen, Yan. 2011.
The potential of social identity for equilibrium selection.
The American Economic Review, 2562–2589.
Chen, Yan, & Li, Sherry Xin. 2009.
Group identity and social preferences.
The American Economic Review, 431–457.
Chen, Yan, Li, Sherry Xin, Liu, Tracy Xiao, & Shih, Margaret. 2014.
Which hat to wear? Impact of natural identities on coordination and cooperation.
Games and Economic Behavior, 84, 58–86.
Cherry, Todd L, Frykblom, Peter, & Shogren, Jason F. 2002.
Hardnose the dictator.
American Economic Review, 1218–1221.
Cohn, Alain, Fehr, Ernst, & Maréchal, Michel André. 2014.
Business culture and dishonesty in the banking industry.
Nature.
Conrads, Julian, Irlenbusch, Bernd, Rilke, Rainer Michael, & Walkowitz, Gari. 2013.
Lying and team incentives.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 34, 1–7.
Conte, Anna, Levati, M Vittoria, & Nardi, Chiara. 2016.
Risk preferences and the role of emotions.
Economica.
118
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Crosetto, Paolo, & Filippin, Antonio. 2013.
The ‚Äúbomb‚Äù risk elicitation task.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 47(1), 31–65.
Croson, Rachel, & Gneezy, Uri. 2009.
Gender differences in preferences.
Journal of Economic literature, 448–474.
Daruvala, Dinky. 2007.
Gender, risk and stereotypes.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 35(3), 265–283.
Dengler-Roscher, Kathrin, Montinari, Natalia, Panganiban, Marian, Ploner, Matteo,
Werner, Benedikt, et al. 2015.
On the Malleability of Fairness Ideals: Order Effects in Partial and Impartial Allocation
Tasks.
Tech. rept. Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
DiMaggio, Paul. 1997.
Culture and cognition.
Annual review of sociology, 263–287.
Dreber, Anna, & Johannesson, Magnus. 2008.
Gender differences in deception.
Economics Letters, 99(1), 197–199.
Eckel, Catherine C, & Grossman, Philip J. 2002.
Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in attitudes toward financial risk.
Evolution and human behavior, 23(4), 281–295.
Eckel, Catherine C, & Grossman, Philip J. 2005.
Managing diversity by creating team identity.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 58(3), 371–392.
Eckel, Catherine C, & Grossman, Philip J. 2008.
Forecasting risk attitudes: An experimental study using actual and forecast gamble
choices.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(1), 1–17.
119
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ellingsen, Tore, & Johannesson, Magnus. 2004.
Promises, threats and fairness.
The Economic Journal, 114(495), 397–420.
Ellingsen, Tore, Johannesson, Magnus, Lilja, Jannie, & Zetterqvist, Henrik. 2009.
Trust and Truth*.
The Economic Journal, 119(534), 252–276.
Engelmann, Dirk, & Strobel, Martin. 2004.
Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experi-
ments.
American economic review, 857–869.
Erat, Sanjiv, & Gneezy, Uri. 2012.
White lies.
Management Science, 58(4), 723–733.
Falk, Armin, & Tirole, Jean. 2016.
Narratives, Imperatives and Moral Reasoning1.
Fehr, Ernst, & Fischbacher, Urs. 2004.
Third-party punishment and social norms.
Evolution and human behavior, 25(2), 63–87.
Fehr-Duda, Helga, De Gennaro, Manuele, & Schubert, Renate. 2006.
Gender, financial risk, and probability weights.
Theory and decision, 60(2-3), 283–313.
Feri, Francesco, Irlenbusch, Bernd, & Sutter, Matthias. 2009.
Efficiency gains from team-based coordination–Large-scale experimental evidence.
Fischbacher, Urs. 2007.
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.
Experimental economics, 10(2), 171–178.
Fischbacher, Urs, & Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska. 2013.
Lies in disguise‚Äîan experimental study on cheating.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3), 525–547.
120
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gächter, Simon, & Schulz, Jonathan F. 2016.
Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies.
Nature.
Gill, David, & Prowse, Victoria. 2012.
A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition.
The American Economic Review, 102(1), 469–503.
Gill, David, Prowse, Victoria, & Vlassopoulos, Michael. 2013.
Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and
productivity.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 96, 120–134.
Gino, Francesca, & Pierce, Lamar. 2009.
Dishonesty in the name of equity.
Psychological Science, 20(9), 1153–1160.
Gino, Francesca, & Pierce, Lamar. 2010a.
Lying to level the playing field: Why people may dishonestly help or hurt others to
create equity.
Journal of Business Ethics, 95(1), 89–103.
Gino, Francesca, & Pierce, Lamar. 2010b.
Robin Hood under the hood: Wealth-based discrimination in illicit customer help.
Organization Science, 21(6), 1176–1194.
Gino, Francesca, Ayal, Shahar, & Ariely, Dan. 2013.
Self-serving altruism? The lure of unethical actions that benefit others.
Journal of economic behavior & organization, 93, 285–292.
Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela, & Lergetporer, Philipp. 2015.
Lying and age: An experimental study.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 46, 12–25.
Gneezy, Uri. 2005.
Deception: The role of consequences.
American Economic Review, 384–394.
Goette, L., Huffman D. Meier S. 2006.
121
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: evidence
using random assignment to real social groups.
American Economic Review, 2(96), 212–6.
Goffman, Erving. 1963.
Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity.
Simon and Schuster.
Gonzalez, Richard, & Wu, George. 1999.
On the shape of the probability weighting function.
Cognitive psychology, 38(1), 129–166.
Greenberg, Jerald. 1990.
Employee theft as a reaction to underpayment inequity: The hidden cost of pay cuts.
Journal of applied psychology, 75(5), 561.
Greiner, Ben. 2004.
An online recruitment system for economic experiments.
Greiner, Ben. 2015.
Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE.
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1), 114–125.
Grolleau, Gilles, Kocher, Martin G, & Sutan, Angela. 2016.
Cheating and Loss Aversion: Do People Cheat More to Avoid a Loss?
Management Science.
Grossman, Philip J. 2013.
Holding fast: the persistence and dominance of gender stereotypes.
Economic Inquiry, 51(1), 747–763.
Harrison, Glenn W, & Rutstrom, E Elisabet. 2008.
Risk aversion in the laboratory.
Harrison, Glenn W, & Swarthout, J Todd. 2012.
The independence axiom and the bipolar behaviorist.
Georgia State University CEEL working paper, 1.
Harrison, Glenn W, & Swarthout, J Todd. 2014.
Experimental payment protocols and the bipolar behaviorist.
Theory and Decision, 77(3), 423–438.
122
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Harrison, Glenn W, Martínez-Correa, Jimmy, & Swarthout, J Todd. 2015.
Reduction of compound lotteries with objective probabilities: Theory and evidence.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 119, 32–55.
Herrmann, Benedikt, Thöni, Christian, & Gächter, Simon. 2008.
Antisocial punishment across societies.
Science, 319(5868), 1362–1367.
Hey, John D. 2001.
Does repetition improve consistency?
Experimental economics, 4(1), 5–54.
Hey, John D, & Orme, Chris. 1994.
Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using experimental data.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1291–1326.
Hilbig, Benjamin E, & Zettler, Ingo. 2015.
When the cat’s away, some mice will play: A basic trait account of dishonest behavior.
Journal of Research in Personality, 57, 72–88.
Hilbig, Benjamin E, Zettler, Ingo, & Heydasch, Timo. 2012.
Personality, punishment and public goods: Strategic shifts towards cooperation as a
matter of dispositional honesty–humility.
European Journal of Personality, 26(3), 245–254.
Hoff, Karla, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2016.
Striving for balance in economics: Towards a theory of the social determination of
behavior.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 126, 25–57.
Hollinger, Richard C, & Clark, John P. 1983.
Deterrence in the workplace: Perceived certainty, perceived severity, and employee
theft.
Social Forces, 62(2), 398–418.
Holt, Charles A, & Laury, Susan K. 2002.
Risk aversion and incentive effects.
American economic review, 92(5), 1644–1655.
123
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Homans, George C. 1958.
Social behavior as exchange.
American journal of sociology, 597–606.
Houser, Daniel, Vetter, Stefan, & Winter, Joachim. 2012.
Fairness and cheating.
European Economic Review, 56(8), 1645–1655.
Hsee, Christopher, & Weber, Elke U. 1998.
Cross-cultural differences in risk perception, but cross-cultural similarities in attitudes
towards perceived risk.
Management Science, 44(9), 1205–1217.
Hsee, Christopher K, & Weber, Elke U. 1997.
A fundamental prediction error: Self–others discrepancies in risk preference.
Journal of experimental psychology: general, 126(1), 45.
Hsee, Christopher K, & Weber, Elke U. 1999.
Cross-national differences in risk preference and lay predictions.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12(2), 165–179.
John, Leslie K, Loewenstein, George, & Rick, Scott I. 2014.
Cheating more for less: Upward social comparisons motivate the poorly compensated
to cheat.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 123(2), 101–109.
Kahneman, Daniel, & Tversky, Amos. 1979.
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society, 263–291.
Kocher, Martin G, & Sutter, Matthias. 2005.
The decision maker matters: Individual versus group behaviour in experimental
beauty-contest games.
The Economic Journal, 115(500), 200–223.
Kocher, Martin G, Schudy, Simeon, & Spantig, Lisa. 2016.
I lie? We lie! Why? Experimental evidence on a dishonesty shift in groups.
Kollock, Peter. 1998.
Transforming social dilemmas: Group identity and cooperation.
124
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Modeling rational and moral agents, 186–210.
Konow, James. 1996.
A positive theory of economic fairness.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 31(1), 13–35.
Konow, James. 2000.
Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation decisions.
American Economic Review, 1072–1091.
Konow, James. 2003.
Which is the fairest one of all? A positive analysis of justice theories.
Journal of economic literature, 1188–1239.
Kramer, Roderick M, & Brewer, Marilynn B. 1984.
Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma.
Journal of personality and social psychology, 46(5), 1044.
Krupka, Erin L, & Weber, Roberto A. 2013.
Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing
vary?
Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3), 495–524.
Levitt, Steven D, & List, John A. 2007.
Viewpoint: On the generalizability of lab behaviour to the field.
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique, 40(2), 347–370.
Marx, K. 1904.
A contribution to the critique of political economy.
Mazar, Nina, & Ariely, Dan. 2006.
Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications.
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25(1), 117–126.
Mazar, Nina, Amir, On, & Ariely, Dan. 2008.
The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-concept maintenance.
Journal of marketing research, 45(6), 633–644.
McLeish, Kendra N, & Oxoby, Robert J. 2007.
Identity, cooperation, and punishment.
IZA Discussion Papers.
125
BIBLIOGRAPHY
McLeish, Kendra N, & Oxoby, Robert J. 2011.
Social interactions and the salience of social identity.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(1), 172–178.
Meier, Stephan, Pierce, Lamar, Vaccaro, Antonino, & Cara, Barbara La. 2016.
Trust and In-Group Favoritism in a Culture of Crime.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, –.
Mittone, Luigi, & Ploner, Matteo. 2012.
Asset legitimacy and distributive justice in the dictator game: an experimental analy-
sis.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(2), 135–142.
Monin, Benoît, & Jordan, Alexander H. 2009.
The dynamic moral self: A social psychological perspective.
Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology, 341–354.
Nese, Annamaria, Palomba, Arturo, Sbriglia, Patrizia, Scudiero, Maurizio, et al. 2013.
Third party punishment and criminal behavior: An experiment with the Italian
Camorra prison inmates.
Economics Bulletin, 33(3), 1875–1884.
Nikiforakis, Nikos, Noussair, Charles N, & Wilkening, Tom. 2012.
Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement.
Journal of Public Economics, 96(9), 797–807.
Pirandello, Luigi. 1926.
Uno, nessuno e centomila.
Ploner, Matteo, & Regner, Tobias. 2013.
Self-image and moral balancing: An experimental analysis.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 374–383.
Plott, Charles R, & Zeiler, Kathryn. 2005.
The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the.
The American Economic Review, 95(3), 530–545.
Quiggin, John. 1982.
A theory of anticipated utility.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 323–343.
126
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rawls, John. 1971.
A theory of justice.
Oxford University Press.
Rong, Rong, Houser, Daniel, & Dai, Anovia Yifan. 2016.
Money or friends: Social identity and deception in networks.
European Economic Review.
Ross, Lee, Greene, David, & House, Pamela. 1977.
The ‚Äúfalse consensus effect‚Äù: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribu-
tion processes.
Journal of experimental social psychology, 13(3), 279–301.
Roth, Benjamin, & Voskort, Andrea. 2014.
Stereotypes and false consensus: How financial professionals predict risk preferences.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 107, 553–565.
Sani, Fabio, Bowe, Mhairi, Herrera, Marina, Manna, Cristian, Cossa, Tiziana, Miao,
Xiulou, & Zhou, Yuefang. 2007.
Perceived collective continuity: Seeing groups as entities that move through time.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(6), 1118–1134.
Schindler, Simon, & Pfattheicher, Stefan. 2016.
The frame of the game: Loss-framing increases dishonest behavior.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
Shalvi, Shaul, Dana, Jason, Handgraaf, Michel JJ, & De Dreu, Carsten KW. 2011.
Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions
and behavior.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115(2), 181–190.
Shalvi, Shaul, Gino, Francesca, Barkan, Rachel, & Ayal, Shahar. 2015.
Self-Serving Justifications Doing Wrong and Feeling Moral.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(2), 125–130.
Siegrist, Michael, Cvetkovich, George, & Gutscher, Heinz. 2002.
Risk preference predictions and gender stereotypes.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 87(1), 91–102.
127
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sturge-Apple, Melissa L, Suor, Jennifer H, Davies, Patrick T, Cicchetti, Dante, Skibo,
Michael A, & Rogosch, Fred A. 2016.
Vagal Tone and Children‚Äôs Delay of Gratification Differential Sensitivity in Resource-
Poor and Resource-Rich Environments.
Psychological science, 0956797616640269.
Sutter, Matthias. 2009.
Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evidence from individuals and
teams.
The Economic Journal, 119(534), 47–60.
Tajfel, Henri, Billig, Michael G, Bundy, Robert P, & Flament, Claude. 1971.
Social categorization and intergroup behaviour.
European journal of social psychology, 1(2), 149–178.
Turner, John C. 1985.
Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior.
Advances in group processes, 2, 77–122.
Tversky, Amos, & Kahneman, Daniel. 1975.
Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.
Pages 141–162 of: Utility, probability, and human decision making.
Springer.
Tversky, Amos, & Kahneman, Daniel. 1992.
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty.
Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323.
Von Neumann, John, & Morgenstern, Oskar. 1944.
Theory of games and economic behavior.
Princeton university press.
Walster, Elaine, Berscheid, Ellen, & Walster, G William. 1973.
New directions in equity research.
Journal of personality and social psychology, 25(2), 151.
Weisel, Ori, & Shalvi, Shaul. 2015.
The collaborative roots of corruption.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(34), 10651–10656.
128
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Weng, Qian, & Carlsson, Fredrik. 2015.
Cooperation in teams: The role of identity, punishment, and endowment distribution.
Journal of Public Economics, 126, 25–38.
Wiltermuth, Scott S. 2011.
Cheating more when the spoils are split.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115(2), 157–168.
Wyer Jr, Robert S, & Wyer Jr, Robert S. 1998.
Stereotype activation and inhibition: Advances in social cognition.
Psychology Press.
Xiao, Erte, & Kunreuther, Howard. 2016.
Punishment and cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(4), 670–693.
129

